CVE-2026-24329: WildFly Denial of Service via Malformed Payload Injection

CVE-2026-24329: WildFly Denial of Service via Malformed Payload Injection

WildFly-core Management Model writes unsanitized user input into standalone.xml, allowing an admin to corrupt the config file and cause an unrecoverable server crash.

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Contents

TL;DR: CVE-2026-24329 lets an authenticated WildFly administrator crash the server and make it unrecoverable by injecting a malformed payload into the Inet Address field of the Management Model. The payload gets written into standalone.xml, and manual file intervention is required to restore service. CVSS 4.9 (Medium), CWE-91.

What to do

There is no patched release at time of writing. The immediate mitigation is access control. Restrict who can authenticate as an administrative user against the WildFly management API.

Bind the management interface to a private network or localhost only:

/interface=management-interface:add(inet-address=127.0.0.1)

Enable RBAC and audit role assignments. The vulnerability requires admin-level privileges, so limiting the admin role to a small set of trusted operators reduces the attack surface significantly:

/core-service=management/access=authorization/role-mapping=SuperUser:read-resource(recursive=true)

If a crash occurs, the recovery procedure is to manually edit the standalone.xml configuration file and remove the malformed payload from the Inet Address field, then restart the server. Keep a known-good backup of standalone.xml for rapid restoration.

What happened

The WildFly Management Model accepts configuration input through its management API. One of the configurable fields is the Inet Address, which specifies network binding addresses for interfaces. The input validation for this field does not properly reject malformed payloads.

An administrative user sends a crafted string into the Inet Address field. The management model writes this value into the server's standalone.xml configuration file without sanitizing it. When the server attempts to parse the corrupted XML on the next startup, the parse fails and the server cannot boot.

The result is a permanent denial of service. The server crashes and will not restart because the configuration file is corrupted. Recovery requires a human to manually edit or replace standalone.xml. In automated deployment environments where servers self-heal through container restarts, this defect defeats the restart loop: the bad config persists across restarts.

Who is affected

WildFly is Red Hat's open-source Jakarta EE application server, the upstream project for JBoss EAP. Organizations deploy it for Java enterprise workloads: web applications, REST APIs, microservices, message-driven beans. WildFly Core provides the management kernel that handles server configuration, lifecycle, and the management API.

Any WildFly deployment where administrative users can access the management model is affected. The CVSS vector confirms the privilege requirement: high privileges needed, network-accessible, no user interaction. Attackers need admin credentials, but the vulnerability itself turns a single management API call into an unrecoverable server crash.

CVSS 3.1 vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE-91 (XML Injection) captures the root cause: user input written into an XML configuration file without escaping or validation. The malformed payload corrupts the XML structure, breaking the parser on load.

Why it matters

The availability impact is high. Unlike a typical DoS where restarting the service resolves the issue, this vulnerability persists across restarts because the corrupted configuration file is loaded on every boot attempt. In containerized environments with orchestration platforms that auto-restart failed containers, the restart loop creates noise without recovery.

The attack requires admin privileges, which limits the threat model to insider attacks, compromised admin credentials, or privilege escalation chains. Organizations with shared admin accounts or broad administrative access should treat this as a priority for access tightening.

Track the Red Hat advisory and Bugzilla entry for patch availability.

References

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