security-detection

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---
name: security-detection
description: Detect infrastructure and security-critical file changes to trigger security agent review recommendations ensuring proper security oversight for sensitive modifications. Use when you ask "did I touch security-critical files", "should the security agent review this". Detection only. Do NOT use to scan source for injection patterns (use security-scan).
license: MIT
metadata:
  routing:
    role: front-door
    invoker: autoplan
    trigger: autoplan routes did-I-touch-security-critical-files questions to security-detection
    user-facing: false
version: 1.0.0
model: haiku
model-rationale: cost. The 'haiku' rolling alias resolves via the platform model_tiers map to a tier priced below the sonnet-tier harness default; this unit is routing/mechanical work where the cheaper tier suffices (ADR-080 rule 3).
---

# Security Detection Utility

## Triggers

| Trigger Phrase | Operation |
|----------------|-----------|
| `scan for security changes` | detect-infrastructure with staged files |
| `check security-critical files` | detect-infrastructure with file list |
| `does this change need security review` | detect-infrastructure analysis |
| `do I need a security review` | Risk-level assessment of changed files |
| `check infrastructure changes` | Pattern matching against critical/high lists |

---

## When to Use

Use this skill when:

- Committing changes that may touch infrastructure or security files
- Pre-commit validation for security-sensitive paths
- Determining if a security agent review is needed
- CI pipeline security gate checks

Use the security agent directly instead when:

- You already know security review is needed
- Performing threat modeling or vulnerability assessment
- Reviewing authentication or authorization code in depth

---

## Available Scripts

| Script | Language | Usage |
|--------|----------|-------|
| `detect_infrastructure.py` | Python 3 | Cross-platform |

## Usage

```bash
# Analyze staged files
python detect_infrastructure.py --use-git-staged

# Analyze specific files
python detect_infrastructure.py --files .github/workflows/ci.yml src/auth/login.cs
```

## Output

**Delegation on each host.** "Delegate to the `X` agent" means the host's subagent tool: Claude Code `Task` with `subagent_type="X"`; Copilot CLI `task` with `agent_type="project-toolkit:X"`; Codex `spawn_agent` with `agent_type="X"`, plus `fork_turns="none"` when the agent reviews or judges work (the default hands it your whole history); Muse Code `subagent_spawn` with `role="X"` and an `objective`, plus `worktree_isolation: true` for an agent that writes files. If the host has no subagent tool, or no `X` agent is installed, run the step yourself in this session.

When security-critical files are detected:

```text
=== Security Review Detection ===

CRITICAL: Security agent review REQUIRED

Matching files:
  [CRITICAL] .github/workflows/deploy.yml
  [HIGH] src/Controllers/AuthController.cs

Run security agent before implementation:
  Delegate to the security agent: "Review infrastructure changes"
  (Claude Code: Task with subagent_type="security"; Copilot CLI: task with
  agent_type="project-toolkit:security"; Codex: spawn_agent with
  agent_type="security"; Muse Code: subagent_spawn with role="security")
```

When no matches:

```text
No infrastructure/security files detected.
```

## Risk Levels

| Level | Meaning | Action |
|-------|---------|--------|
| CRITICAL | Immediate security implications | Review REQUIRED |
| HIGH | Potential security impact | Review RECOMMENDED |

## Detected Patterns

### Critical (Review Required)

- CI/CD workflows (`.github/workflows/*`)
- Git hook configuration (`{lefthook,.lefthook,lefthook-local,.lefthook-local}.{yml,yaml,json,jsonc,toml}`, `.config/{lefthook,lefthook-local}.{yml,yaml,json,jsonc,toml}`, `.husky/*`)
- Git hook policy (`scripts/validation/git_hook_policy.py`)
- Authentication code (`**/Auth/**`, `**/Security/**`)
- Environment files (`*.env*`)
- Credentials and keys (`*.pem`, `*.key`, `*secret*`)

### High (Review Recommended)

- Build scripts (`build/**/*.ps1`, `scripts/**/*.sh`)
- Container configs (`Dockerfile*`, `docker-compose*`)
- API controllers (`**/Controllers/**`)
- App configuration (`appsettings*.json`)
- Infrastructure as Code (`*.tf`, `*.tfvars`, `*.bicep`)

## Integration

### Pre-commit Hook

Add a named validator job to `lefthook.yml`:

```bash
# Security detection (non-blocking warning)
( for d in "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}" "${COPILOT_PLUGIN_ROOT}" .claude; do if [ -n "$d" ] && [ -f "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" ]; then exec python3 "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" skills/security-detection/detect_infrastructure.py --use-git-staged; fi; done; echo "ptk_run: no plugin root holds lib/ptk_run.py" >&2; exit 2 )
```

### CI Integration

On a Linux pull-request runner, pass the changed paths explicitly. CI checkouts
do not have a staged diff.

```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
  with:
    fetch-depth: 0

- name: Check security-critical files
  shell: bash
  env:
    BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
    HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
  run: >-
    git diff --no-renames --name-only -z "$BASE_SHA" "$HEAD_SHA"
    | ( for d in "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}" "${COPILOT_PLUGIN_ROOT}" .claude; do if [ -n "$d" ] && [ -f "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" ]; then exec python3 "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" skills/security-detection/detect_infrastructure.py --files-from-stdin; fi; done; echo "ptk_run: no plugin root holds lib/ptk_run.py" >&2; exit 2 )
```

## Exit Codes

| Code | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| 0 | Detection finished. Matches print a warning that does not block. With `--require-security-review`, also: no CRITICAL file, or every CRITICAL file has a valid security review marker. |
| 1 | `--require-security-review` is set and a CRITICAL file has no valid marker on the ref (BLOCKED). |
| 3 | `--require-security-review` is set and git could not answer while reading the staged index or the review marker (git missing, timed out, exited non-zero, returned undecodable output, or rejected the ref) (BLOCKED). An unanswered check never counts as a marker. |

Without `--require-security-review` the scripts always exit 0, so advisory use
in commits and CI stays non-blocking. The warning is informational only. Only
the flag turns a CRITICAL finding or a failed git read into a blocking exit.

## Customization

Edit the pattern lists in either script to add or modify detection patterns:

- `CRITICAL_PATTERNS` / `$CriticalPatterns` - Review required
- `HIGH_PATTERNS` / `$HighPatterns` - Review recommended

## Process

1. Gather the list of changed files (staged or explicit)
2. Run pattern matching against critical and high-risk file patterns
3. Report findings with risk level classification
4. Route to security agent if CRITICAL matches found

## Anti-Patterns

| Avoid | Why | Instead |
|-------|-----|---------|
| Skipping detection before commits | Security files slip through unreviewed | Run detection on every commit with infrastructure changes |
| Treating warnings as blocking | Scripts exit 0 intentionally | Use output to inform review decisions, not block commits |
| Hardcoding custom patterns inline | Drifts from canonical pattern lists | Edit CRITICAL_PATTERNS/HIGH_PATTERNS in the scripts |
| Ignoring HIGH-level matches | Potential security impact overlooked | Review HIGH matches, escalate to security agent when uncertain |
| Running only one language script | May miss platform-specific detection | Use whichever script matches your environment |

---

## Verification

After running security detection:

- [ ] Script exited with code 0, or with 1 or 3 only under `--require-security-review` (blocked)
- [ ] All CRITICAL matches reviewed
- [ ] Security agent routed for CRITICAL findings
- [ ] HIGH matches evaluated for review need
- [ ] Output captured in session log if security-relevant

---

## Related Documents

Backticked paths below are in the `rjmurillo/ai-agents` repository. They do not ship with this skill; a consumer install cannot resolve them.

- `.project-toolkit/security/infrastructure-file-patterns.md`. Infrastructure file patterns.
- `.project-toolkit/security/static-analysis-checklist.md`. Security agent capabilities.
- `docs/orchestrator-routing-algorithm.md`. Orchestrator routing algorithm.

<!-- vendor-portability: declared. This skill cites .project-toolkit/security/infrastructure-file-patterns.md, .project-toolkit/security/static-analysis-checklist.md, and docs/orchestrator-routing-algorithm.md as background reading. All three are citations only; the detection patterns documented here are self-contained, so a vendored install loses the further reading, not the capability. -->