Attackers are taking over Puppet servers, the machines that set up all your other servers. CVE-2026-115731 is on CISA KEV

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How to fix CVE-2026-115731: upgrade Puppet Enterprise to 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1 (Puppet Core 8.22.2 or 9.1.3, OpenVox Server 8.18.0 or 9.2.0). Attackers are using it to run their own code on the Puppet server, which configures every machine it manages. CISA added it to KEV on Nov 17.

Attackers are taking over Puppet servers, the machines that set up all your other servers. CVE-2026-115731 is on CISA KEV
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Attackers are using a bug in Puppet to run their own code on the Puppet server, the machine that tells every other managed server and laptop how to configure itself. CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17, 2026, with a December 1 deadline for federal agencies. Perforce fixed it in Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 and 2026.0.1 on November 3. If you run Puppet, upgrade the primary server and compilers first, then check who your certificate authority has been signing for.

The bug lives in how Puppet Server reads the report every agent sends after a run. Any machine holding a signed agent certificate can send a report with a crafted event in it, and the server runs code from that report as its service user. Where the CA autosigns new machines, that certificate is easy to get, so the attack needs no password at all. This post is the operator read of the Perforce advisory, the OpenVox advisory GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq and the Neodyme write-up from the researchers who found it. The HOL Guard evidence pack for CVE-2026-115731 is the source record.

How to fix

Upgrade to a release that carries the fixed Puppet code, starting with the primary server, then compilers and replicas:

  • Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.x (LTS): 2023.8.13
  • Puppet Enterprise 2025.x: 2025.12.1
  • Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.x: 2026.0.1
  • Puppet Core (Perforce's commercial builds): 8.22.2 or 9.1.3
  • OpenVox Server: 8.18.0 or 9.2.0, with openvox-agent 8.32.0 or 9.3.0 on the server

Check what the primary is running:

cat /opt/puppetlabs/server/pe_version
puppet --version

The first line is the PE release. The second is the Puppet code version the server loads. On PE or Puppet Core you want 8.22.2 or 9.1.3 or later. On OpenVox you want 8.32.0 or 9.3.0 or later. The vulnerable code is the Ruby report handler that Puppet Server runs from the agent package installed on the server itself. The OpenVox release notes spell out the trap: if you upgrade only the agent package on a server, restart puppetserver yourself, or the old code stays loaded.

The same releases also fix CVE-2026-115732, a certificate name check that let evil.target.example.com pass as target.example.com in auth rules. Perforce's PE release notes add that the compromised eMudhra intermediate CAs are gone from the bundled trust stores, the same certificate problem we covered in CVE-2026-111943. One upgrade covers all three.

Check autosign before you do anything else

Autosign is what turns this from "a managed machine can attack the server" into "anyone who can reach port 8140 can attack the server". On the CA server:

puppet config print autosign --section server
  • true means naive autosigning: the CA signs every request. Anyone who can reach the server gets a certificate and can use this bug. Change it now.
  • A path to autosign.conf means basic autosigning against a list of names and globs. Read that file. A line like *.example.com lets any host that picks an unused matching name get a certificate. The OpenVox docs call basic autosigning "essentially insecure" for exactly this reason.
  • A path to an executable means policy-based autosigning. That is only as strong as what the script checks. A script that approves anything matching your naming pattern is a glob with extra steps.
  • false, or an empty or missing autosign.conf, means requests wait for a human. The attacker then needs a certificate you already issued.

If you can't upgrade today, Vox Pupuli's advice for unpatched servers is short: disable or tighten autosign, and make the server reachable only from the networks that need it. To turn autosign off, set autosign = false in the [server] section of puppet.conf on the CA server, or switch to a policy script that checks each request against your provisioning system. Vox Pupuli also publishes standalone patch scripts for old versions, with a clear warning that you own the result. None of this is a fix. Any machine that already holds a certificate, including one an attacker took over, can still send the bad report.

Why the Puppet server is the wrong box to lose

Puppet's job is to push configuration, packages and often secrets to every machine it manages, so whoever controls it has a path to all of them. The OpenVox advisory says code running as the puppet user can read the CA signing key, which lets an attacker mint certificates for any host name, including the server's own. Neodyme's write-up walks through what that buys, depending on how the deployment is set up:

  • Catalogs often carry database passwords, API tokens and service logins for the machines they configure. With the CA key, an attacker can request any machine's catalog.
  • Where the puppet user can write to the code or catalog it serves, the next agent run on every managed machine executes what the attacker put there. Hardened installs keep that code owned by a different user.
  • On Puppet Enterprise, Neodyme minted a certificate with the stolen CA key and used the orchestrator (PXP, port 8142) to run commands as root on a managed agent in their lab.

The working exploit has been public since November 3. The OpenVox advisory includes a complete report body that runs a shell command, so the two weeks between the fix and today's KEV listing were two weeks with a copy-paste exploit available. CISA has not said who is exploiting it or whether ransomware crews are involved. Its catalog lists ransomware use as unknown.

If the server was exposed, look for a break-in

Patching stops new attacks. It does not undo one that already happened, and a rotated CA is a big job, so check first:

puppetserver ca list --all

Look for signed certificates you don't recognise, especially names that fit your autosign glob and were issued since early November. Look for unexpected child processes of the Puppet Server Java process, and for shell commands or outbound connections run by the puppet user. If you find any of that, treat the CA key as stolen: rebuild the server, reissue the CA and every agent certificate, and rotate the secrets your catalogs hand out. Updating Puppet and keeping the old CA leaves the attacker able to sign their way back in.

Who is not in scope

  • Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, 2026.0.1 and later, Puppet Core 8.22.2 and 9.1.3 and later, and OpenVox Server 8.18.0 and 9.2.0 and later.
  • Machines that only run the agent. The OpenVox release notes say agent-only hosts are not exposed and can upgrade on their normal schedule. The bug is on the server that reads the reports.
  • Nobody running the old open-source Puppet is out of scope. Neodyme says the exploit also works on open-source Puppet 6.24.0 from 2021, and Vox Pupuli says all known Puppet implementations were affected. Open-source Puppet from Perforce gets no more updates, and the public puppetlabs/puppet repository has had no commits since December 2024. Those servers need to move to OpenVox or Puppet Core.

What this is not

This is not a bug in the agents on your laptops and servers, and it is not a password-free attack on every Puppet server. An attacker needs a signed agent certificate first. The catch is how easy that certificate is to get on servers that autosign, which Neodyme says is common in large companies that enroll new machines through tools like Satellite or Ansible.

What do people ask about CVE-2026-115731?

Which versions fix CVE-2026-115731?

Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 and 2026.0.1; Puppet Core 8.22.2 and 9.1.3; OpenVox Server 8.18.0 and 9.2.0 with openvox-agent 8.32.0 and 9.3.0.

Is CVE-2026-115731 being exploited?

Yes. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17, 2026, with a December 1 due date. CISA lists ransomware use as unknown. A working proof of concept has been public in the OpenVox advisory since November 3.

Does CVE-2026-115731 need a login?

It needs a signed Puppet agent certificate. If the CA autosigns requests by name or glob, anyone who can reach the server can get one, so in practice it needs no password.

Is open-source Puppet affected?

Yes. Neodyme reproduced it on open-source Puppet 6.24.0, and Perforce no longer ships open-source updates. Move to OpenVox 8.18.0 or 9.2.0 or later, or to Puppet Core.

Do I need to upgrade every Puppet agent?

Upgrade the Puppet servers first, including compilers. Agent-only machines are not exposed and can follow your normal schedule.

Is there a workaround?

No full one. Turning off autosign and limiting who can reach port 8140 removes the easy path, but any machine that already has a certificate can still exploit an unpatched server.

References

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