AsyncAPI Miasma loader compromise
Direct answer
AsyncAPI Miasma loader compromise, also tracked as AsyncAPI namespace compromise is a high-severity threat campaign HOL Guard tracked from Jul 14, 2026 to Jul 14, 2026, verified against 1 primary source and last reviewed Sep 2, 2026. Active tracking has ended and the record remains published as a permanent historical research record.
Socket documented four compromised packages in the @asyncapi npm namespace that delivered a multi-stage loader on macOS, Linux, and Windows through malicious published package contents.
Also tracked as AsyncAPI namespace compromise
- First observed
- Jul 14, 2026
- Last observed
- Jul 14, 2026
- Last reviewed
- Sep 2, 2026
- Tracking ended
- Sep 8, 2026
Record exports
Uncertainty and limitations
Read the evidence limits before acting on this record.
The record reflects Socket analysis published July 14, 2026. HOL has not independently attributed the actor or measured the full installed victim population.
- Public campaign details intentionally omit live infrastructure and executable payload material.
Guard coverage and policy
What Guard's reviewed assertions do and do not claim for this campaign, and the reviewed starting points for defense.
Not covered, or partially covered
partial
Guard can apply package-install policy on eligible observed actions, but it does not replace registry intelligence or endpoint response after a malicious package has executed.
- Recipe available
Require review or explicit approval for new or changed dependency installation before an eligible package-manager action executes.
Coverage depends on the active Guard release, package manager, harness event surface, and local policy. It is not a guarantee that every dependency path is intercepted.
Safe next step. Campaign guidance is defensive context. It does not auto-apply policy or claim universal campaign coverage.
Timeline
Reviewed events, oldest first, each tied to a verified source.
- First observed
AsyncAPI Miasma loader compromise was first observed in the reviewed source material.
- Disclosure
The reviewed source published or updated its defensive analysis and remediation guidance.
Publication clock: 635.5 hours from reviewed disclosure timestamp to HOL publication; 24-hour high target; historical backfill outside target.
Reviewed artifacts
The specific artifacts this record concerns, as reviewed. Names and versions are shown as text; a registry link is not recorded here.
@asyncapi affected package releasesnpmpackage
Sources
Every claim on this record is traceable to the sources below.
Campaign questions, answered
Socket documented four compromised packages in the @asyncapi npm namespace that delivered a multi-stage loader on macOS, Linux, and Windows through malicious published package contents. HOL Guard tracked the campaign from Jul 14, 2026 to Jul 14, 2026.
No. Active tracking ended Sep 8, 2026; this page remains as a labeled historical research record and does not imply the threat is currently active.
The record cites 1 primary source, names 1 reviewed artifact, and was last fully reviewed Sep 2, 2026 by HOL Guard Research. Its uncertainty and limitations are stated on the record itself.
Campaign guidance is defensive context. It does not auto-apply policy or claim universal campaign coverage. The campaign-specific policy starting point is linked from the coverage section of this record.
The permalink above is permanent. The full record can be downloaded from this page as JSON, an artifact CSV, and a STIX 2.1 bundle, and corrections can be requested through the published correction path on the record. The record reflects Socket analysis published July 14, 2026. HOL has not independently attributed the actor or measured the full installed victim population.
Record HGTC-2026-ASYNCAPI26