Answer in brief
CVE-2021-21291 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.4) vulnerability in Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy (go), github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy (go), github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxygo | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7go | >=0 <7.0.0 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
May 25, 2021
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect. For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for `.example.com`, the intention is that subdomains of `example.com` are allowed. Instead, `example.com` and `badexample.com` could also match. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain. # Original Issue Posted by @semoac: Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain. ## Expected Behavior If whitelist domain is set to `.example.com` , then `hack.alienexample.com` should be rejected as a valid redirect. ## Current Behavior The code is removing the `dot` from `.example.com` and only checking if the redirect string end with `example.com` ## Possible Solution Here https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661 Include the dot when checking the string: ``` strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname) ``` ## Steps to Reproduce (for bugs) ``` package main import ( "fmt" "strings" ) func validOptionalPort(port string) bool { if port == "" || port == ":*" { return true } if port[0] != ':' { return false } for _, b := range port[1:] { if b < '0' || b > '9' { return false } } return true } func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) { host = hostport colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':') if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) { host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:] } if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") { host = host[1 : len(host)-1] } return } func main() { domain := ".example.com" domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, ".")) redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com" if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")} } ``` Users of `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy` are advised to update to `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7`
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.