Answer in brief
CVE-2022-48733 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 3.7 | Not reported |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=c37b2b6269ee4637fb7cdb5da0d1e47215d57ce2 <7e4c72dbaf62f8978af8321a24dbd35566d3a78a || >=c37b2b6269ee4637fb7cdb5da0d1e47215d57ce2 <a7b717fa15165d3d9245614680bebc48a52ac05d || >=c37b2b6269ee4637fb7cdb5da0d1e47215d57ce2 <9372fa1d73da5f1673921e365d0cd2c27ec7adc2 || >=c37b2b6269ee4637fb7cdb5da0d1e47215d57ce2 <28b21c558a3753171097193b6f6602a94169093a | 7e4c72dbaf62f8978af8321a24dbd35566d3a78a, a7b717fa15165d3d9245614680bebc48a52ac05d, 9372fa1d73da5f1673921e365d0cd2c27ec7adc2, 28b21c558a3753171097193b6f6602a94169093a |
Published upstream
Jun 20, 2024
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 4, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and then attach it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots. After that we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump to 'fail' label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot: 1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots; 2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(). In both cases, we don't abort the transaction and we release our transaction handle. We jump to the 'fail' label and free the pending snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the transaction's list; 3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there's no error at all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free. This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the following warning: fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: '&pending_snapshot->list' not removed from list So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the pending snapshot to the transaction's list. Instead add the pending snapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction() we add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error returned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which case the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can access it anymore.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.