mindsdb arbitrary file write when extracting a remotely retrieved TarballCVE-2023-30620

### Summary An unsafe extraction is being performed using `tarfile.extractall()` from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. Sometimes, the vulnerability is called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant. ### Details I commented the following snippet of code as a vulnerability details. The code is from [file.py#L26..L134](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/afedd37c16e579b6dc075b0814e42d0505ccdc07/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py#L26..L134) ```python @ns_conf.route('/<name>') @ns_conf.param('name', "MindsDB's name for file") class File(Resource): @ns_conf.doc('put_file') def put(self, name: str): ''' add new file params in FormData: - file - original_file_name [optional] ''' data = {} ... omitted for brevity url = data['source'] data['file'] = data['name'] ... omitted for brevity with requests.get(url, stream=True) as r: # Source: retrieve the URL which point to a remotely located tarball if r.status_code != 200: return http_error( 400, "Error getting file", f"Got status code: {r.status_code}" ) file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file']) with open(file_path, 'wb') as f: for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192): # write with chunks the remote retrieved file into file_path location f.write(chunk) original_file_name = data.get('original_file_name') file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file']) lp = file_path.lower() if lp.endswith(('.zip', '.tar.gz')): if lp.endswith('.zip'): with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path) as f: f.extractall(temp_dir_path) elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'): with tarfile.open(file_path) as f: # Just after f.extractall(temp_dir_path) # Sink: the tarball located by file_path is supposed to be extracted to temp_dir_path. ``` So, a remotely available tarball is being retrieved and written to the server filesystem in chunks, and then, if the extension ends with `.tar.gz` of a compressed tarball, the mindsdb app applies `tarfile.extractall()` directly with no checks for the destination. However, according to the following [warning](https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile.TarFile.extractall) from the official documentation; > Warning: Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. It is possible that files are created outside of path, e.g. members that have absolute filenames starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..". ### PoC The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file `sim4n6.txt` to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder. ```bash > tar --list -v -f archive.tar.gz tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names ../../../sim4n6.txt > python3 Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information. >>> import tarfile >>> with tarfile.open("archive.tar.gz") as tf: >>> tf.extractall() >>> exit() > test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists" sim4n6.txt exists ``` ### Attack Scenario An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely, proceed to the PUT request of the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server for instance. ### Mitigation Potential mitigation could be to: - Use a safer module, like `zipfile`. - Use an alternative of `tarfile`, such as `tarsafe`. - Validate the location or the absolute path of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path `../../..` or absolute path such as `/etc/password`. A simple wrapper could be written to raise an exception when a path traversal may be identified. This is similar to the other report [GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.