Answer in brief
CVE-2023-37474 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in copyparty vulnerable to path traversal attack. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps copyparty (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps copyparty (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| copypartypypi | >=0 <1.8.2 | 1.8.2 |
Published upstream
Jul 14, 2023
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
# Summary All versions before 1.8.2 have a path traversal vulnerability, allowing an attacker to download unintended files from the server. # Details Unauthenticated users were able to retrieve any files which are accessible (according to OS-level permissions) from the copyparty process. Usually, this is all files that are readable by the OS account which is used to run copyparty. The vulnerability did not make it possible to list the contents of folders, so an attacker needs to know the full absolute path to the file, or the relative path from where copyparty is installed. Some methods of running copyparty ([prisonparty](https://github.com/9001/copyparty/tree/hovudstraum/bin#prisonpartysh), the [nix package](https://github.com/9001/copyparty#nix-package), and [docker](https://github.com/9001/copyparty/tree/hovudstraum/scripts/docker)) had a mitigating effect, mostly reducing the attack scope to files inside copyparty volumes, and possibly the copyparty config file. # Checking for attacks Please keep in mind that, if an attacker were to find a way to overwrite the logs, for example by discovering the password to another service with sufficient privileges, then the following approaches cannot be trusted. if copyparty was only accessible through a reverse proxy, then all attacks would be visible in the webserver access-log as URLs which contain both `.cpr/` and `%2F` * nginx: ```bash (gzip -dc access.log*.gz; cat access.log) | sed -r 's/" [0-9]+ .*//' | grep -E 'cpr/.*%2[^0]' | grep -vF data:image/svg ``` However, if copyparty was directly accessible from the internet, then any successful attacks (file retrievals) would unfortunately leave no trace. That said, it is very probable that an attacker would make at least one invalid attempt, which would become apparent in the copyparty server log, detectable with `grep -aE '(Errno|Permission).*\.cpr/'` revealing the following: * python2 example: `[IOError] [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/etc/shadow', .cpr//etc/shadow` * python3 example: `[PermissionError] [Errno 13] Permission denied: b'/etc/shadow', .cpr//etc/shadow` Providing an exact command for this approach is difficult, as it depends on how copyparty is deployed; * if copyparty was running as a systemd service: `journalctl -am | grep -aE '(Errno|Permission).*\.cpr/'` * if copyparty was logging to a compressed file: `xz -kdc thefilename.xz | grep -aE '(Errno|Permission).*\.cpr/'` * if the copyparty log is available in a plaintext file: `grep -aE '(Errno|Permission).*\.cpr/' thefilename.txt` # PoC / attack example ```bash curl -sik http://127.0.0.1:3923/.cpr/%2Fetc%2Fpasswd curl -sik http://127.0.0.1:3923/.cpr/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd ```
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.