Related issue & discussion: - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview#publishing - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns ### Impact Any users who save untrusted URLs and view the content they output. The impact is potentially severe if you are logged in to the ArchiveBox admin site in the same browser session and view an archived malicious page designed to target your ArchiveBox instance. Malicious JS could potentially act using your logged-in admin credentials and add/remove/modify snapshots, add/remove/modify ArchiveBox users, and generally do anything an admin user could do. The impact is less severe for non-logged-in users, as malicious JS cannot *modify* any archives, but it can still *read* all the other archived content by fetching the snapshot index and iterating through it. Because all of ArchiveBox's archived content is served from the same host and port as the admin panel with 0 XSS protections, when archived pages are viewed the JS executes in the same context as all the other archived pages (and the admin panel), defeating most of the browser's usual CORS/CSRF security protections and leading to this issue. ### Patches Follow here for progress on mitigating this issue: https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 ### Workarounds Disable the risky extractors by setting [`archivebox config --set SAVE_WGET=False SAVE_DOM=False`](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Configuration#save_wget), ensure you are always logged out, or serve only a [static HTML version](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#2-export-and-host-it-as-static-html) of your archive. ### References - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox#caveats - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns
Related issue & discussion: - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview#publishing - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns ### Impact Any users who save untrusted URLs and view the content they output. The impact is potentially severe if you are logged in to the ArchiveBox admin site in the same browser session and view an archived malicious page designed to target your ArchiveBox instance. Malicious JS could potentially act using your logged-in admin credentials and add/remove/modify snapshots, add/remove/modify ArchiveBox users, and generally do anything an admin user could do. The impact is less severe for non-logged-in users, as malicious JS cannot *modify* any archives, but it can still *read* all the other archived content by fetching the snapshot index and iterating through it. Because all of ArchiveBox's archived content is served from the same host and port as the admin panel with 0 XSS protections, when archived pages are viewed the JS executes in the same context as all the other archived pages (and the admin panel), defeating most of the browser's usual CORS/CSRF security protections and leading to this issue. ### Patches Follow here for progress on mitigating this issue: https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 ### Workarounds Disable the risky extractors by setting [`archivebox config --set SAVE_WGET=False SAVE_DOM=False`](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Configuration#save_wget), ensure you are always logged out, or serve only a [static HTML version](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#2-export-and-host-it-as-static-html) of your archive. ### References - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox#caveats - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns
Update archivebox to 0.9.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanViewing wget extractor output while logged in as an admin allows archived JS to execute in the admins context affects archivebox (pip). Severity is high. Related issue & discussion: - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview#publishing - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns ### Impact Any users who save untrusted URLs and view the content they output. The impact is potentially severe if you are logged in to the ArchiveBox admin site in the same browser session and view an archived malicious page designed to target your ArchiveBox instance. Malicious JS could potentially act using your logged-in admin credentials and add/remove/modify snapshots, add/remove/modify ArchiveBox users, and generally do anything an admin user could do. The impact is less severe for non-logged-in users, as malicious JS cannot *modify* any archives, but it can still *read* all the other archived content by fetching the snapshot index and iterating through it. Because all of ArchiveBox's archived content is served from the same host and port as the admin panel with 0 XSS protections, when archived pages are viewed the JS executes in the same context as all the other archived pages (and the admin panel), defeating most of the browser's usual CORS/CSRF security protections and leading to this issue. ### Patches Follow here for progress on mitigating this issue: https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 ### Workarounds Disable the risky extractors by setting [`archivebox config --set SAVE_WGET=False SAVE_DOM=False`](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Configuration#save_wget), ensure you are always logged out, or serve only a [static HTML version](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#2-export-and-host-it-as-static-html) of your archive. ### References - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox#caveats - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| archiveboxpip | <0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate archivebox to 0.9.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanViewing wget extractor output while logged in as an admin allows archived JS to execute in the admins context affects archivebox (pip). Severity is high. Related issue & discussion: - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview#publishing - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns ### Impact Any users who save untrusted URLs and view the content they output. The impact is potentially severe if you are logged in to the ArchiveBox admin site in the same browser session and view an archived malicious page designed to target your ArchiveBox instance. Malicious JS could potentially act using your logged-in admin credentials and add/remove/modify snapshots, add/remove/modify ArchiveBox users, and generally do anything an admin user could do. The impact is less severe for non-logged-in users, as malicious JS cannot *modify* any archives, but it can still *read* all the other archived content by fetching the snapshot index and iterating through it. Because all of ArchiveBox's archived content is served from the same host and port as the admin panel with 0 XSS protections, when archived pages are viewed the JS executes in the same context as all the other archived pages (and the admin panel), defeating most of the browser's usual CORS/CSRF security protections and leading to this issue. ### Patches Follow here for progress on mitigating this issue: https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/issues/239 ### Workarounds Disable the risky extractors by setting [`archivebox config --set SAVE_WGET=False SAVE_DOM=False`](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Configuration#save_wget), ensure you are always logged out, or serve only a [static HTML version](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#2-export-and-host-it-as-static-html) of your archive. ### References - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox#caveats - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Security-Overview - https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox/wiki/Publishing-Your-Archive#security-concerns
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| archiveboxpip | <0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard