Answer in brief
CVE-2023-53333 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2023-53333 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <337fdce450637ea663bc816edc2ba81e5cdad02e || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <9bdcda7abaf22f6453e5b5efb7eb4e524095d5d8 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <c052797ac36813419ad3bfa54cb8615db4b41f15 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <5c618daa5038712c4a4ef8923905a2ea1b8836a1 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <26bd1f210d3783a691052c51d76bb8a8bbd24c67 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30 | 337fdce450637ea663bc816edc2ba81e5cdad02e, 9bdcda7abaf22f6453e5b5efb7eb4e524095d5d8, c052797ac36813419ad3bfa54cb8615db4b41f15, 5c618daa5038712c4a4ef8923905a2ea1b8836a1, 26bd1f210d3783a691052c51d76bb8a8bbd24c67, 8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927, ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.26 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2025
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 4, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <337fdce450637ea663bc816edc2ba81e5cdad02e || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <9bdcda7abaf22f6453e5b5efb7eb4e524095d5d8 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <c052797ac36813419ad3bfa54cb8615db4b41f15 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <5c618daa5038712c4a4ef8923905a2ea1b8836a1 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <26bd1f210d3783a691052c51d76bb8a8bbd24c67 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927 || >=2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e <ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30 | 337fdce450637ea663bc816edc2ba81e5cdad02e, 9bdcda7abaf22f6453e5b5efb7eb4e524095d5d8, c052797ac36813419ad3bfa54cb8615db4b41f15, 5c618daa5038712c4a4ef8923905a2ea1b8836a1, 26bd1f210d3783a691052c51d76bb8a8bbd24c67, 8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927, ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.26 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2025
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 4, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.