Answer in brief
CVE-2024-26800 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=6.6.18 <6.6.21 || >=6.7.6 <6.7.9 | 6.6.21, 6.7.9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=cd1bbca03f3c1d845ce274c0d0a66de8e5929f72 <f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89 || >=13eca403876bbea3716e82cdfe6f1e6febb38754 <81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe || >=ab6397f072e5097f267abf5cb08a8004e6b17694 <1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1 || >=8590541473188741055d27b955db0777569438e3 <13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0 || 3ade391adc584f17b5570fd205de3ad029090368 || >=5.15.160 <5.16 | f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89, 81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe, 1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1, 13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0, 5.16 |
Published upstream
Apr 4, 2024
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path, releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done. The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the memory has already been released.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.