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Back to active CVEs
High ยท CVSS 7.0CVE-2024-26960

mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff()CVE-2024-26960

Answer in brief

CVE-2024-26960 records a High severity (CVSS 7.0) vulnerability in mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), linux/linux_kernel (generic), linux/linux_kernel (generic) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published May 1, 2024Updated Oct 15, 2026Source checked Nov 4, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 5, 2026Material review Oct 15, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High ยท CVSS 7.0
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
14 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), linux/linux_kernel (generic), linux/linux_kernel (generic) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Affected products and reported versions
ProductAffected versionsFixed versions
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39 || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b || >=7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e <82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688ed85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d, 2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e, 1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a, 0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a, 3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39, 363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b, 82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688e
Linux/Linuxgeneric4.11Not reported
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <d85c11c97ecfd85c11c97ecf
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <2da5568ee2222da5568ee222
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <1ede7f1d7eed1ede7f1d7eed
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <0f98f6d2fb5f0f98f6d2fb5f
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <3ce4c4c653e43ce4c4c653e4
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <363d17e7f790363d17e7f790
linux/linux_kernelgeneric>=7c00bafee87c <82b1c07a0af682b1c07a0af6
linux/linux_kernelgeneric4.11Not reported
Siemens/SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystemgeneric>=0 <**
Siemens/SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystemgeneric>=0 <V1.1.1V1.1.1

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, linux/linux_kernel.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d; linux/linux_kernel to d85c11c97ecf; linux/linux_kernel to 2da5568ee222; linux/linux_kernel to 1ede7f1d7eed; linux/linux_kernel to 0f98f6d2fb5f; linux/linux_kernel to 3ce4c4c653e4; linux/linux_kernel to 363d17e7f790; linux/linux_kernel to 82b1c07a0af6; Siemens/SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem to *; Siemens/SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem to V1.1.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    May 1, 2024

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 15, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 5, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencecert-portal.siemens.com
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencelists.debian.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below). Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache(). Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this): --8<----- __swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in "count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE". swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries. Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls __try_to_reclaim_swap(). __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ... WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? --8<-----

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-362
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 4, 2026
References
9 linked sources
Open source record