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  4. CVE 2024 47813 wasmtime race condition could lead to webassembly
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Back to active CVEs
Low ยท CVSS 2.9CVE-2024-47813GHSA-7QMX-3FPX-R45M

Wasmtime race condition could lead to WebAssembly control-flow integrity and type safety violationsCVE-2024-47813

Answer in brief

CVE-2024-47813 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.9) vulnerability in Wasmtime race condition could lead to WebAssembly control-flow integrity and type safety violations. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps wasmtime (crates.io), wasmtime (rust), wasmtime (rust), wasmtime (rust) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 3, 2024Updated Oct 12, 2026Source checked Oct 12, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 11, 2026Material review Oct 12, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Low ยท CVSS 2.9
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
6 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 2.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps wasmtime (crates.io), wasmtime (rust), wasmtime (rust), wasmtime (rust) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
wasmtimecrates.io>=19.0.0 <21.0.2 >=22.0.0 <22.0.1 >=23.0.0 <23.0.3 >=24.0.0 <24.0.1 >=25.0.0 <25.0.221.0.2, 22.0.1, 23.0.3, 24.0.1, 25.0.2
wasmtimerust>=19.0.0,<21.0.221.0.2
wasmtimerust>=22.0.0,<22.0.122.0.1
wasmtimerust>=23.0.0,<23.0.323.0.3
wasmtimerust>=24.0.0,<24.0.124.0.1
wasmtimerust>=25.0.0,<25.0.225.0.2

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for wasmtime, wasmtime, wasmtime.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update wasmtime to 21.0.2; wasmtime to 21.0.2; wasmtime to 22.0.1; wasmtime to 23.0.3; wasmtime to 24.0.1; wasmtime to 25.0.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 3, 2024

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 12, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencecrates.io
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • Source referencerustsec.org
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

### Impact Under certain concurrent event orderings, a `wasmtime::Engine`'s internal type registry was susceptible to double-unregistration bugs due to a race condition, leading to panics and potentially type registry corruption. That registry corruption could, following an additional and particular sequence of concurrent events, lead to violations of WebAssembly's control-flow integrity (CFI) and type safety. Users that do not use `wasmtime::Engine` across multiple threads are not affected. Users that only create new modules across threads over time are additionally not affected. Reproducing this bug requires creating and dropping multiple type instances (such as `wasmtime::FuncType` or `wasmtime::ArrayType`) concurrently on multiple threads, where all types are associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`. **Wasm guests cannot trigger this bug.** See the "References" section below for a list of Wasmtime types-related APIs that are affected. Wasmtime maintains an internal registry of types within a `wasmtime::Engine` and an engine is shareable across threads. Types can be created and referenced through creation of a `wasmtime::Module`, creation of `wasmtime::FuncType`, or a number of other APIs where the host creates a function (see "References" below). Each of these cases interacts with an engine to deduplicate type information and manage type indices that are used to implement type checks in WebAssembly's `call_indirect` function, for example. This bug is a race condition in this management where the internal type registry could be corrupted to trigger an assert or contain invalid state. Wasmtime's internal representation of a type has individual types (e.g. one-per-host-function) maintain a registration count of how many time it's been used. Types additionally have state within an engine behind a read-write lock such as lookup/deduplication information. The race here is a time-of-check versus time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug where one thread atomically decrements a type entry's registration count, observes zero registrations, and then acquires a lock in order to unregister that entry. However, between when this first thread observed the zero-registration count and when it acquires that lock, another thread could perform the following sequence of events: re-register another copy of the type, which deduplicates to that same entry, resurrecting it and incrementing its registration count; then drop the type and decrement its registration count; observe that the registration count is now zero; acquire the type registry lock; and finally unregister the type. Now, when the original thread finally acquires the lock and unregisters the entry, it is the second time this entry has been unregistered. | Thread A | Thread B | |-----------------------------------|--------------------------------| | `acquire(type registry lock)` | | | | `decref(E) --> 0` | | | `block_on(type registry lock)` | | `register(E') == incref(E) --> 1` | | | `release(type registry lock)` | | | `decref(E) --> 0` | | | `acquire(type registry lock)` | | | `unregister(E)` | | | `release(type registry lock)` | | | | `acquire(type registry lock)` | | | `unregister(E)` | This double-unregistration could then lead to a WebAssembly CFI violation under the following conditions: a new WebAssembly module `X` was loaded into the engine before the second, buggy unregistration occurs; `X` defined a function type `F` that was allocated in the same type registry slot where the original entry was allocated; the second, buggy unregistration incorrectly unregistered `F`; another new WebAssembly module `Y` was loaded into the engine; `Y` defined a function type `G`, different from `F`, but which is also allocated in the same type registry slot; a `funcref` of type `G` is created, either by the host or by Wasm; that `funcref` is passed to a WebAssembly instance of module `X`; that instance performs a `call_indirect` to that `funcref`; the `call_indirect`'s dynamic type check, which preserves CFI, could incorrectly pass in this case, because `F` and `G` were assigned the same type registry slot. This would, ultimately, allow calling a function with too many, too few, or wrongly-typed arguments, violating CFI and type safety. We were not able to reproduce this CFI violation in a vanilla Wasmtime build, although it remains theoretically possible. However, by modifying Wasmtime's source code to make losing the races described above more likely (by disabling certain assertions, inserting panic catches, and adding retry loops in a few places if we did *not* lose the race) we were able to incorrectly get a `funcref` to pass a type check that it should have failed, which would allow the CFI violation. ### Patches This bug was originally introduced in Wasmtime 19's development of the WebAssembly GC proposal. This bug affects users who are not using the GC proposal, however, and affects Wasmtime in its default configuration even when the GC proposal is disabled. Wasmtime users using 19.0.0 and after are all affected by this issue. We have released the following Wasmtime versions, all of which have a fix for this bug: * 21.0.2 * 22.0.1 * 23.0.3 * 24.0.1 * 25.0.2 ### Workarounds If your application creates and drops Wasmtime types on multiple threads concurrently, there are no known workarounds. Users are encouraged to upgrade to a patched release. ### References The following APIs create or drop types, and therefore are affected by this race condition if performed on multiple threads concurrently and are all associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`: * [`wasmtime::FuncType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html#method.new) * Also reachable from creation of [`wasmtime::Func`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html) * Also reachable from [`wasmtime::Linker::func_*`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html#method.func_new) * [`wasmtime::ArrayType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html#method.new) * [`wasmtime::StructType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html#method.new) * [`wasmtime::Func::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Global::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Global.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Table::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Table.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Extern::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Extern.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Export::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Export.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::ImportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ImportType.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::ExportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExportType.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Val::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Val.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::Ref::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Ref.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::AnyRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.AnyRef.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::EqRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.EqRef.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::ArrayRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayRef.html#method.ty) * [`wasmtime::StructRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructRef.html#method.ty) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::FuncType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::ArrayType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::StructType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::ExternType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExternType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::GlobalType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.GlobalType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::TableType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.TableType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::ValType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ValType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::RefType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.RefType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::HeapType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.HeapType.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html) * Dropping a [`wasmtime::Linker`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html) The change which introduced this bug was [#7969](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/7969)

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 12, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record