### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens `ghs_...`) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in [Atlantis v0.30.0](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered: - Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications. - Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application. - Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using [Terraform's GitHub integration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/integrations/github/latest). Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as: ```json {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}} ``` This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters. While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis. This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists [CVE-2022-24912](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912), which is unrelated). Could you please publish a security advisory? ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ - This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). - This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis. - This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.
### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens `ghs_...`) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in [Atlantis v0.30.0](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered: - Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications. - Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application. - Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using [Terraform's GitHub integration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/integrations/github/latest). Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as: ```json {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}} ``` This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters. While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis. This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists [CVE-2022-24912](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912), which is unrelated). Could you please publish a security advisory? ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ - This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). - This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis. - This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.
Update github.com/runatlantis/atlantis to 0.30.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGit credentials are exposed in Atlantis logs affects github.com/runatlantis/atlantis (go). Severity is high. ### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens `ghs_...`) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in [Atlantis v0.30.0](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered: - Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications. - Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application. - Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using [Terraform's GitHub integration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/integrations/github/latest). Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as: ```json {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}} ``` This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters. While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis. This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists [CVE-2022-24912](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912), which is unrelated). Could you please publish a security advisory? ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ - This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). - This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis. - This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/runatlantis/atlantisgo | <0.30.0 | 0.30.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/runatlantis/atlantis to 0.30.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGit credentials are exposed in Atlantis logs affects github.com/runatlantis/atlantis (go). Severity is high. ### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens `ghs_...`) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in [Atlantis v0.30.0](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered: - Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications. - Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application. - Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using [Terraform's GitHub integration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/integrations/github/latest). Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as: ```json {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}} {"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}} ``` This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters. While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis. This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists [CVE-2022-24912](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912), which is unrelated). Could you please publish a security advisory? ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ - This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). - This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis. - This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/runatlantis/atlantisgo | <0.30.0 | 0.30.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard