HOL LogoGuard

Explore HOL

  • HOL home
  • AI agent registry
  • AI plugins
  • Open standards
  • HOL members
  • Sponsor HOL
  • Advertise with HOL

Guard product

  • Guard overviewLocal security and control for AI agents and the tools they use.
  • FeaturesRuntime protection, policy routing, review, and evidence.

Explore Guard

  • Product previewWalk through Guard surfaces in read-only demo mode.
  • ComparisonCompare Guard with native controls and AI security vendors.

AI tools

  • All AI toolsEvery supported AI tool and how Guard applies policy to it.
  • Codex
  • Claude Code
  • Cursor
  • Antigravity CLI
  • OpenCode
  • Hermes
  • OpenClaw
  • GitHub Copilot CLI
  • Antigravity
  • Kimi
  • Grok
  • Pi / Oh My Pi
  • Zcode

Extensions

  • All extensionsBrowse command and MCP coverage with owners and stated limits.
  • Command coverageShell command protection across clouds, databases, backups, and packages.
  • MCP server coverageSee how Guard maps risk state across MCP tools and servers.
  • Core safetyThe safety floor listings that ship with Guard.
  • Data and resilienceBackup and storage command protection.
  • Cloud and infrastructureAWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and more.

Security

  • AI security hubSecurity research, advisories, and agent safety coverage.
  • AI tool securitySecurity profiles for each supported coding agent.
  • Safe labsHands-on attack simulations with safe boundaries.
  • Redacted warningsReal blocked actions with sensitive details removed.
  • AdvisoriesCoordinated disclosure reports for AI tooling.
  • Active CVEsSearch active CVEs affecting AI tooling.

Learn

  • Security guidesPractical guides for securing AI agent workflows.
  • DocsInstall, configure, and operate Guard with confidence.
  • ResearchPublished security research, benchmarks, and methodology.

Community

  • ReleasesVersion history, shipped changes and upgrade notes.
  • ContributorsThe people and contributions behind HOL Guard.
  • AffiliatesShare Guard with your audience and earn from referrals.
  • SponsorFund agreed research, implementation and shared testing through the HOL Partner Program.
  • AdvertiseCompare README logo placements, previews and monthly prices, or promote a plugin or extension.
PricingEnterpriseOpen AppInstall Guard
  1. Guard
  2. Security
  3. CVEs
  4. CVE 2025 40123 bpf enforce expectedattachtype for tailcall
HOL Guard

Public security guidance for teams protecting AI harnesses, MCP servers, skills, prompts, and local tool execution.

Install Guard

AI Security

  • Prompt injection
  • MCP security
  • OWASP MCP mapping
  • Supply chain

Resources

  • Trust packet
  • Harness setup
  • Redacted warnings
  • Safe labs

Product

  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
  • Open dashboard
Guard
  • Guard Overview
  • Releases
  • Contributors
  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
Docs
  • Documentation Index
  • Developer Hub
  • API Reference
  • Root OpenAPI
  • Registry OpenAPI
  • Run in Postman
  • Standards
  • Submit ERC-8004 Contract
  • Feature Your Agent
Best Plugins
  • Browse Plugins
  • Plugin Launches
  • Best Claude Plugins
  • Best Codex Plugins
  • Best Grok Plugins
  • Best Kimi Plugins
  • Best DeepSeek Plugins
  • Best Antigravity Plugins
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best Cursor Plugins
  • Best OpenCode Plugins
Best Agents
  • Best ERC-8004 Agents
  • Best Virtuals Agents
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best A2A Agents
  • Best x402 Payable
  • All Categories
Community
  • Contribute to HOL
  • Telegram
  • X
More
  • About HOL
  • Sponsor
  • Advertise
  • Affiliate program
  • Contact
  • Blog
  • GitHub
  • Privacy
  • Terms of Service
Settings

Copyright © 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.8CVE-2025-40123

bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibilityCVE-2025-40123

Answer in brief

CVE-2025-40123 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Nov 12, 2025Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Nov 5, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 5, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 5, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric4.17Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <e53a59e7cee5c1605d1ed595933098c2b69108f9 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <dc4f348952173beb8ceb15be30b249276eccb605 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <a99de19128aec0913f3d529f529fbbff5edfaff8 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <08cb3dc9d2b44f153d0bcf2cb966e4a94b5d0f32 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <f856c598080ba7ce1252867b8ecd6ad5bdaf9a6a || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <c1ad19b5d8e23123503dcaf2d4342e1b90b923ad || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <4540aed51b12bc13364149bf95f6ecef013197c0e53a59e7cee5c1605d1ed595933098c2b69108f9, dc4f348952173beb8ceb15be30b249276eccb605, a99de19128aec0913f3d529f529fbbff5edfaff8, 08cb3dc9d2b44f153d0bcf2cb966e4a94b5d0f32, f856c598080ba7ce1252867b8ecd6ad5bdaf9a6a, c1ad19b5d8e23123503dcaf2d4342e1b90b923ad, 4540aed51b12bc13364149bf95f6ecef013197c0
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <a99de19128aec0913f3d529f529fbbff5edfaff8 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <08cb3dc9d2b44f153d0bcf2cb966e4a94b5d0f32 || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <f856c598080ba7ce1252867b8ecd6ad5bdaf9a6a || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <c1ad19b5d8e23123503dcaf2d4342e1b90b923ad || >=5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 <4540aed51b12bc13364149bf95f6ecef013197c0a99de19128aec0913f3d529f529fbbff5edfaff8, 08cb3dc9d2b44f153d0bcf2cb966e4a94b5d0f32, f856c598080ba7ce1252867b8ecd6ad5bdaf9a6a, c1ad19b5d8e23123503dcaf2d4342e1b90b923ad, 4540aed51b12bc13364149bf95f6ecef013197c0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to e53a59e7cee5c1605d1ed595933098c2b69108f9; Linux/Linux to a99de19128aec0913f3d529f529fbbff5edfaff8 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Nov 12, 2025

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 5, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility Yinhao et al. recently reported: Our fuzzer tool discovered an uninitialized pointer issue in the bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() function within the Linux kernel's BPF subsystem. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when a BPF program attempts to deference the txq member of struct xdp_buff object. The test initializes two programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: progA acts as the entry point for bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() and its expected_attach_type can neither be of be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP nor BPF_XDP_CPUMAP. progA calls into a slot of a tailcall map it owns. progB's expected_attach_type must be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP to pass xdp_is_valid_access() validation. The program returns struct xdp_md's egress_ifindex, and the latter is only allowed to be accessed under mentioned expected_attach_type. progB is then inserted into the tailcall which progA calls. The underlying issue goes beyond XDP though. Another example are programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR. sock_addr_is_valid_access() as well as sock_addr_func_proto() have different logic depending on the programs' expected_attach_type. Similarly, a program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME should not be allowed doing a tailcall into a program which calls bpf_bind() out of BPF which is only enabled for BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT. In short, specifying expected_attach_type allows to open up additional functionality or restrictions beyond what the basic bpf_prog_type enables. The use of tailcalls must not violate these constraints. Fix it by enforcing expected_attach_type in __bpf_prog_map_compatible(). Note that we only enforce this for tailcall maps, but not for BPF devmaps or cpumaps: There, the programs are invoked through dev_map_bpf_prog_run*() and cpu_map_bpf_prog_run*() which set up a new environment / context and therefore these situations are not prone to this issue.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.