h11 accepts some malformed Chunked-Encoding bodiesCVE-2025-43859

### Impact A leniency in h11's parsing of line terminators in chunked-coding message bodies can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions. ### Details HTTP/1.1 Chunked-Encoding bodies are formatted as a sequence of "chunks", each of which consists of: - chunk length - `\r\n` - `length` bytes of content - `\r\n` In versions of h11 up to 0.14.0, h11 instead parsed them as: - chunk length - `\r\n` - `length` bytes of content - any two bytes i.e. it did not validate that the trailing `\r\n` bytes were correct, and if you put 2 bytes of garbage there it would be accepted, instead of correctly rejecting the body as malformed. By itself this is harmless. However, suppose you have a proxy or reverse-proxy that tries to analyze HTTP requests, and your proxy has a _different_ bug in parsing Chunked-Encoding, acting as if the format is: - chunk length - `\r\n` - `length` bytes of content - more bytes of content, as many as it takes until you find a `\r\n` For example, [pound](https://github.com/graygnuorg/pound/pull/43) had this bug -- it can happen if an implementer uses a generic "read until end of line" helper to consumes the trailing `\r\n`. In this case, h11 and your proxy may both accept the same stream of bytes, but interpret them differently. For example, consider the following HTTP request(s) (assume all line breaks are `\r\n`): ``` GET /one HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Transfer-Encoding: chunked 5 AAAAAXX2 45 0 GET /two HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Transfer-Encoding: chunked 0 ``` Here h11 will interpret it as two requests, one with body `AAAAA45` and one with an empty body, while our hypothetical buggy proxy will interpret it as a single request, with body `AAAAXX20\r\n\r\nGET /two ...`. And any time two HTTP processors both accept the same string of bytes but interpret them differently, you have the conditions for a "request smuggling" attack. For example, if `/two` is a dangerous endpoint and the job of the reverse proxy is to stop requests from getting there, then an attacker could use a bytestream like the above to circumvent this protection. Even worse, if our buggy reverse proxy receives two requests from different users: ``` GET /one HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Transfer-Encoding: chunked 5 AAAAAXX999 0 ``` ``` GET /two HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Cookie: SESSION_KEY=abcdef... ``` ...it will consider the first request to be complete and valid, and send both on to the h11-based web server over the same socket. The server will then see the two concatenated requests, and interpret them as _one_ request to `/one` whose body includes `/two`'s session key, potentially allowing one user to steal another's credentials. ### Patches Fixed in h11 0.15.0. ### Workarounds Since exploitation requires the combination of buggy h11 with a buggy (reverse) proxy, fixing either component is sufficient to mitigate this issue. ### Credits Reported by Jeppe Bonde Weikop on 2025-01-09.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.