Answer in brief
CVE-2025-54799 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api does not enforce HTTPS. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/go-acme/lego (go), github.com/go-acme/lego/v3 (go), github.com/go-acme/lego/v4 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/go-acme/lego (go), github.com/go-acme/lego/v3 (go), github.com/go-acme/lego/v4 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/go-acme/legogo | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/go-acme/lego/v3go | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/go-acme/lego/v4go | >=0 <4.25.2 | 4.25.2 |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2025
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
## Summary It was discovered that the github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api package (thus the lego library and the lego cli as well) don't enforce HTTPS when talking to CAs as an ACME client. ## Details Unlike the http-01 challenge which solves an ACME challenge over unencrypted HTTP, the ACME protocol requires HTTPS when a client communicates with the CA to performs ACME functions. This is stated in 6.1 of RFC 8555: [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.1) > Each ACME function is accomplished by the client sending a sequence > of HTTPS requests to the server [[RFC2818](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2818)], carrying JSON messages > [[RFC8259](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8259)]. Use of HTTPS is REQUIRED. Each subsection of [Section 7](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-7) > below describes the message formats used by the function and the > order in which messages are sent. However, the library fails to enforce HTTPS both in the original discover URL (configured by the library user) and in the subsequent addresses returned by the CAs in the directory and order objects. If the library user accidentally inputs an HTTP URL, or the CA similarly misconfigures its endpoints, this will cause the relevant parts of the protocol to be performed over HTTP. This can result, at the very least, in a lost of privacy of the request/response details, such as account and request identifiers (which could be intercepted by an attacker in a privileged network position). We did not investigate whether other more serious threats could result from the ability to impersonate a CA for some of the protocol requests, but enforcing HTTPS usage is definitely the safe choice. ## Reproducing This is illustrated in the attached http_acme_test.go. Since it uses private field Core.directory, this test must be placed inside the source directory of https://github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api to run. Please note that this only checks getting the directory and creating a new account, but other ACME functions are likely impacted as well, such as creating orders, getting and checking order authorizations. <details> ```go package api import ( "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rand" "fmt" "net/http" "strings" "testing" "time" "github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme" ) const letsEncryptURLHTTP = "http://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" const letsEncryptURLHTTPS = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" func changeToHTTP(url *string) { if strings.HasPrefix(*url, "https:") { *url = "http" + (*url)[len("https"):] } } func changeToHTTPS(url *string) { if strings.HasPrefix(*url, "http:") { *url = "https" + (*url)[len("http"):] } } func TestHTTPURLs(t *testing.T) { privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("error generating a private key: %v", err) } func() { t.Log("testing that Discover enforces https") _, err := New(&http.Client{ Transport: &httpsOnlyRoundTripper{inner: http.DefaultTransport}, Timeout: 20 * time.Second, }, "", letsEncryptURLHTTP, "", privateKey) if err != nil { t.Errorf("New error: %v", err) } }() core, err := New(&http.Client{ Transport: &httpsOnlyRoundTripper{inner: http.DefaultTransport}, Timeout: 20 * time.Second, }, "", letsEncryptURLHTTPS, "", privateKey) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("New error: %v", err) } func() { t.Log("testing that account creation enforces https") // Simulate a misconfigured CA that gives out HTTP directory URLs and when // we're done change it back to HTTPS to test the rest. changeToHTTP(&core.directory.NewAccountURL) defer changeToHTTPS(&core.directory.NewAccountURL) _, err := core.Accounts.New(acme.Account{ TermsOfServiceAgreed: true, Contact: []string{}, }) if err != nil { t.Errorf("core.Accounts.New error: %v", err) } }() _, err = core.Accounts.New(acme.Account{ TermsOfServiceAgreed: true, Contact: []string{}, }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("core.Accounts.New error: %v", err) } } type httpsOnlyRoundTripper struct { inner http.RoundTripper } func (r *httpsOnlyRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { if req.URL.Scheme != "https" { return nil, fmt.Errorf("non-https request is being sent") } return r.inner.RoundTrip(req) } ``` </details> _
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.