Answer in brief
CVE-2025-54801 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Fiber Crashes in BodyParser Due to Unvalidated Large Slice Index in Decoder in github.com/gofiber/fiber. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2go | >=0 <2.52.9 | 2.52.9 |
Published upstream
Aug 5, 2025
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
### Description When using Fiber's `Ctx.BodyParser` to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., `test.18446744073704`), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder. The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length `idx + 1` without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If `idx` is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash. ### Steps to Reproduce Create a POST request handler that accepts `x-www-form-urlencoded` data ```go package main import ( "fmt" "net/http" "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2" ) type RequestBody struct { NestedContent []*struct{} `form:"test"` } func main() { app := fiber.New() app.Post("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error { formData := RequestBody{} if err := c.BodyParser(&formData); err != nil { fmt.Println(err) return c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity) } return nil }) fmt.Println(app.Listen(":3000")) } ``` Run the server and send a POST request with a large numeric key in form data, such as: ```bash curl -v -X POST localhost:3000 --data-raw 'test.18446744073704' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' ``` ### Relevant Code Snippet Within the decoder's [decode method](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2.52.8/internal/schema/decoder.go#L249): ```go idx := parts[0].index if v.IsNil() || v.Len() < idx+1 { value := reflect.MakeSlice(t, idx+1, idx+1) // <-- Panic/crash occurs here when idx is huge if v.Len() < idx+1 { reflect.Copy(value, v) } v.Set(value) } ``` The `idx` is not validated before use, leading to unsafe slice allocation for extremely large values. --- ### Impact - Application panic or crash on malicious or malformed input. - Potential denial of service (DoS) via memory exhaustion or server crash. - Lack of defensive checks in the parsing code causes instability.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.