Answer in brief
CVE-2025-58058 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory when decoding a corrupted multiple LZMA archives. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/ulikunitz/xz (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/ulikunitz/xz (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/ulikunitz/xzgo | >=0 <0.5.15 | 0.5.15 |
Published upstream
Aug 28, 2025
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
### Summary It is possible to put data in front of an LZMA-encoded byte stream without detecting the situation while reading the header. This can lead to increased memory consumption because the current implementation allocates the full decoding buffer directly after reading the header. The LZMA header doesn't include a magic number or has a checksum to detect such an issue according to the [specification](https://github.com/jljusten/LZMA-SDK/blob/master/DOC/lzma-specification.txt). Note that the code recognizes the issue later while reading the stream, but at this time the memory allocation has already been done. ### Mitigations The release v0.5.15 includes following mitigations: - The ReaderConfig DictCap field is now interpreted as a limit for the dictionary size. - The default is 2 Gigabytes - 1 byte (2^31-1 bytes). - Users can check with the [Reader.Header] method what the actual values are in their LZMA files and set a smaller limit using ReaderConfig. - The dictionary size will not exceed the larger of the file size and the minimum dictionary size. This is another measure to prevent huge memory allocations for the dictionary. - The code supports stream sizes only up to a pebibyte (1024^5). Note that the original v0.5.14 version had a compiler error for 32 bit platforms, which has been fixed by v0.5.15. ### Methods affected Only software that uses [lzma.NewReader](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ulikunitz/xz/lzma#NewReader) or [lzma.ReaderConfig.NewReader](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ulikunitz/xz/lzma#ReaderConfig.NewReader) is affected. There is no issue for software using the xz functionality. I thank @GregoryBuligin for his report, which is provided below. ### Summary When unpacking a large number of LZMA archives, even in a single goroutine, if the first byte of the archive file is 0 (a zero byte added to the beginning), an error __writeMatch: distance out of range__ occurs. Memory consumption spikes sharply, and the GC clearly cannot handle this situation. ### Details Judging by the error __writeMatch: distance out of range__, the problems occur in the code around this function. https://github.com/ulikunitz/xz/blob/c8314b8f21e9c5e25b52da07544cac14db277e89/lzma/decoderdict.go#L81 ### PoC Run a function similar to this one in 1 or several goroutines on a multitude of LZMA archives that have a 0 (a zero byte) added to the beginning. ``` const ProjectLocalPath = "some/path" const TmpDir = "tmp" func UnpackLZMA(lzmaFile string) error { file, err := os.Open(lzmaFile) if err != nil { return err } defer file.Close() reader, err := lzma.NewReader(bufio.NewReader(file)) if err != nil { return err } tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp(TmpDir, TmpLZMAPrefix) if err != nil { return err } defer func() { tmpFile.Close() _ = os.Remove(tmpFile.Name()) }() sha256Hasher := sha256.New() multiWriter := io.MultiWriter(tmpFile, sha256Hasher) if _, err = io.Copy(multiWriter, reader); err != nil { return err } unpackHash := hex.EncodeToString(sha256Hasher.Sum(nil)) unpackDir := filepath.Join( ProjectLocalPath, unpackHash[:2], ) _ = os.MkdirAll(unpackDir, DirPerm) unpackPath := filepath.Join(unpackDir, unpackHash) return os.Rename(tmpFile.Name(), unpackPath) } ``` ### Impact Servers with a small amount of RAM that download and unpack a large number of unverified LZMA archives
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.