Answer in brief
CVE-2025-59426 records a Medium severity (CVSS 4.3) vulnerability in lobe-chat has an Open Redirect. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @lobehub/chat (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 4.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @lobehub/chat (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:lobehub:lobe_chat:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @lobehub/chatnpm | >=0 <1.130.1 | 1.130.1 |
Published upstream
Sep 24, 2025
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 11, 2026
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
### **Description** --- > Vulnerability Overview > The project's OIDC redirect handling logic constructs the host and protocol of the final redirect URL based on the X-Forwarded-Host or Host headers and the X-Forwarded-Proto value. In deployments where a reverse proxy forwards client-supplied X-Forwarded-* headers to the origin as-is, or where the origin trusts them without validation, an attacker can inject an arbitrary host and trigger an open redirect that sends users to a malicious domain. > Vulnerable Code Analysis > ```bash const internalRedirectUrlString = await oidcService.getInteractionResult(uid, result); log('OIDC Provider internal redirect URL string: %s', internalRedirectUrlString); let finalRedirectUrl; try { finalRedirectUrl = correctOIDCUrl(request, new URL(internalRedirectUrlString)); } catch { finalRedirectUrl = new URL(internalRedirectUrlString); log('Warning: Could not parse redirect URL, using as-is: %s', internalRedirectUrlString); } return NextResponse.redirect(finalRedirectUrl, { headers: request.headers, status: 303, }); ``` https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/aa841a3879c30142720485182ad62aa0dbd74edc/src/app/(backend)/oidc/consent/route.ts#L113-L127 ### PoC --- > curl Example > ```bash curl -i 'http://localhost:3210/oidc/callback/desktop?code=abc&state=test123' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: google.com' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https' ``` <img width="1504" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b71d937d-7be2-49db-8f3d-e07371912800" /> ### Impact --- - It can force users to redirect to untrusted external domains, leading to subsequent attacks such as phishing, credential harvesting, and session fixation. - It can disrupt the OAuth/OIDC flow user experience by redirecting users to malicious domains disguised as legitimate pages (even though this path doesn't directly include tokens, it can be exploited for social engineering attacks through redirect chains). - The impact can be amplified when redirect chains are combined with other vulnerabilities such as CSP bypass or cache poisoning.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.