Answer in brief
CVE-2025-61780 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.8) vulnerability in Rack has a Possible Information Disclosure Vulnerability. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| rackrubygems | >=0 <2.2.20 | 2.2.20 |
| rackrubygems | >=3.0 <3.1.18 | 3.1.18 |
| rackrubygems | >=3.2 <3.2.3 | 3.2.3 |
Published upstream
Oct 10, 2025
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
## Summary A possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in `Rack::Sendfile` when running behind a proxy that supports `x-sendfile` headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause `Rack::Sendfile` to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions. ## Details When `Rack::Sendfile` received untrusted `x-sendfile-type` or `x-accel-mapping` headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a "redirect" response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was **not subject to the proxy's access controls**. An attacker could exploit this by: 1. Setting a crafted `x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirect` header. 2. Setting a crafted `x-accel-mapping` header. 3. Requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration. ## Impact Attackers could bypass proxy-enforced restrictions and access internal endpoints intended to be protected (such as administrative pages). The vulnerability did not allow arbitrary file reads but could expose sensitive application routes. This issue only affected systems meeting all of the following conditions: * The application used `Rack::Sendfile` with a proxy that supports `x-accel-redirect` (e.g., Nginx). * The proxy did **not** always set or remove the `x-sendfile-type` and `x-accel-mapping` headers. * The application exposed an endpoint that returned a body responding to `.to_path`. ## Mitigation * Upgrade to a fixed version of Rack which requires explicit configuration to enable `x-accel-redirect`: ```ruby use Rack::Sendfile, "x-accel-redirect" ``` * Alternatively, configure the proxy to always set or strip the headers (you should be doing this!): ```nginx proxy_set_header x-sendfile-type x-accel-redirect; proxy_set_header x-accel-mapping /var/www/=/files/; ``` * Or in Rails applications, disable sendfile completely: ```ruby config.action_dispatch.x_sendfile_header = nil ```
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.