Answer in brief
CVE-2025-71074 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in functionfs: fix the open/removal races. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <585a656283c954337036422afcd9cb70dd4135e7 || >=ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <75240e5e51c6e6d67a3039384125fa54259a3926 || >=ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <e5bf5ee266633cb18fff6f98f0b7d59a62819eee | 585a656283c954337036422afcd9cb70dd4135e7, 75240e5e51c6e6d67a3039384125fa54259a3926, e5bf5ee266633cb18fff6f98f0b7d59a62819eee |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.35 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jan 13, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 21, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: functionfs: fix the open/removal races ffs_epfile_open() can race with removal, ending up with file->private_data pointing to freed object. There is a total count of opened files on functionfs (both ep0 and dynamic ones) and when it hits zero, dynamic files get removed. Unfortunately, that removal can happen while another thread is in ffs_epfile_open(), but has not incremented the count yet. In that case open will succeed, leaving us with UAF on any subsequent read() or write(). The root cause is that ffs->opened is misused; atomic_dec_and_test() vs. atomic_add_return() is not a good idea, when object remains visible all along. To untangle that * serialize openers on ffs->mutex (both for ep0 and for dynamic files) * have dynamic ones use atomic_inc_not_zero() and fail if we had zero ->opened; in that case the file we are opening is doomed. * have the inodes of dynamic files marked on removal (from the callback of simple_recursive_removal()) - clear ->i_private there. * have open of dynamic ones verify they hadn't been already removed, along with checking that state is FFS_ACTIVE.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.