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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.1CVE-2025-71127

wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast addressCVE-2025-71127

Answer in brief

CVE-2025-71127 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jan 14, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 19, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 19, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-20
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 19, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.1
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <be0974be5c42584e027883ac2af7dab5e950098c || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <0a59a3895f804469276d188effa511c72e752f35 || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <88aab153d1528bc559292a12fb5105ee97528e1f || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <6e5bff40bb38741e40c33043ba0816fba5f93661 || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <7b240a8935d554ad36a52c2c37c32039f9afaef2 || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <a21704df4024708be698fb3fd5830d5b113b70e0 || >=af2d14b01c32d7cba65f73503586e5b621afb139 <193d18f60588e95d62e0f82b6a53893e5f2f19f8be0974be5c42584e027883ac2af7dab5e950098c, 0a59a3895f804469276d188effa511c72e752f35, 88aab153d1528bc559292a12fb5105ee97528e1f, 6e5bff40bb38741e40c33043ba0816fba5f93661, 7b240a8935d554ad36a52c2c37c32039f9afaef2, a21704df4024708be698fb3fd5830d5b113b70e0, 193d18f60588e95d62e0f82b6a53893e5f2f19f8
Linux/Linuxgeneric5.7Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to be0974be5c42584e027883ac2af7dab5e950098c if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jan 14, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 19, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address Beacon frames are required to be sent to the broadcast address, see IEEE Std 802.11-2020, 11.1.3.1 ("The Address 1 field of the Beacon .. frame shall be set to the broadcast address"). A unicast Beacon frame might be used as a targeted attack to get one of the associated STAs to do something (e.g., using CSA to move it to another channel). As such, it is better have strict filtering for this on the received side and discard all Beacon frames that are sent to an unexpected address. This is even more important for cases where beacon protection is used. The current implementation in mac80211 is correctly discarding unicast Beacon frames if the Protected Frame bit in the Frame Control field is set to 0. However, if that bit is set to 1, the logic used for checking for configured BIGTK(s) does not actually work. If the driver does not have logic for dropping unicast Beacon frames with Protected Frame bit 1, these frames would be accepted in mac80211 processing as valid Beacon frames even though they are not protected. This would allow beacon protection to be bypassed. While the logic for checking beacon protection could be extended to cover this corner case, a more generic check for discard all Beacon frames based on A1=unicast address covers this without needing additional changes. Address all these issues by dropping received Beacon frames if they are sent to a non-broadcast address.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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