Vulnerability-Lookup - Race Condition in Account Recovery Token Consumption Allows Password Takeover (CVE-2026-101041) | HOL Guard CVE

Medium · CVSS 6.3CVE-2026-101041

Vulnerability-Lookup - Race Condition in Account Recovery Token Consumption Allows Password Takeover

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-101041 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in Vulnerability-Lookup - Race Condition in Account Recovery Token Consumption Allows Password Takeover. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 27, 2026Updated Sep 27, 2026Source checked Sep 27, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 27, 2026Material review Sep 27, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Medium · CVSS 6.3
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookupgeneric	>=0 <=6.2.0	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup.
Review the reported fix. Source-reported solution: The non-atomic check-then-consume pattern is replaced with a single conditional UPDATE statement (compare-and-set) that atomically verifies the stored SHA-256 nonce digest, updates the password hash, sets is_confirmed, and clears the token in one database operation. Only the first transaction to commit succeeds; all concurrent attempts match zero rows and are rejected with an error. The view now calls form.validate() before processing the password change, enforcing the form's length and equality validators. The dead consume_account_token() method is removed to eliminate the non-atomic consumption path entirely.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Sep 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Sep 27, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

The account recovery (password reset) functionality in the vulnerability-lookup web application contains a time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in the consumption of single-use recovery tokens. The original implementation verified the token nonce against the stored digest and then consumed (cleared) it in separate database operations. Two concurrent HTTP requests presenting the same valid recovery token could both pass the verification check before either transaction committed, allowing both to set their own password on the target account. The last transaction to commit overwrites the first, enabling an attacker who possesses a valid recovery token to replace the legitimate user's password with one of their choosing. A secondary defect in the same endpoint (confirm_account) allowed a valid recovery link to be used to set an empty or trivially short password (e.g., three characters). The view handler performed only a manual equality comparison between the two password fields and never invoked the form's validation logic, bypassing the intended minimum-length and complexity constraints. The affected component is the user account recovery endpoint (/user/confirm_account/<token>) and the associated token verification and consumption logic in the User model (website/models/user.py) and the view layer (website/web/views/user.py).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.