Answer in brief
CVE-2026-102649 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in Burrito: Unauthenticated webhooks trigger unauthorized Terraform plans when webhookSecret is unset. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps padok-team/burrito (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps padok-team/burrito (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| padok-team/burritogeneric | <0.13.0 | 0.13.0 |
Published upstream
Oct 26, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 26, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 26, 2026
Burrito is a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software (TACoS) Kubernetes operator. Prior to 0.13.0, `POST /api/webhook` accepts unsigned GitHub and GitLab events when a `TerraformRepository`'s credentials omit `webhookSecret` or set it to an empty value, including credentials configured for git authentication and polling. `Credential.WebhookSecret` is optional, and `go-playground/webhooks` skips signature or token verification when the secret is empty. Anyone who can reach `burrito-server`'s endpoint and knows a tracked repository's URL can forge events to create or delete `TerraformPullRequest` custom resources with attacker-chosen `Branch`, `Base`, and `ID` fields. For GitHub `pull_request` events, the controller fetches changed files using the real pull request number but does not cross-check the payload's branch against that pull request. Pairing a real, existing pull request number with an unrelated existing branch in the same repository can therefore cause an unauthorized `terraform plan` for affected layers using the operator's stored git and cloud credentials. Code analysis also indicates that the resulting plan can be posted to the real pull request's comment thread, exposing and misattributing another branch's infrastructure changes. Auto-apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so this vulnerability alone cannot force a `terraform apply`; plan-time provider and data-source code execution depends on the selected branch's contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.