CISA ADP Vulnrichment

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-102759 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in CISA ADP Vulnrichment. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Eclipse Foundation/NetX Duo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 29, 2026Updated Sep 29, 2026Source checked Sep 30, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 29, 2026Material review Sep 29, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Medium · CVSS 6.3
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Eclipse Foundation/NetX Duo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
Eclipse Foundation/NetX Duogeneric	>=6.2.0 <=6.5.1.202602	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Eclipse Foundation/NetX Duo.
Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Sep 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Sep 29, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

GitHub security advisorygithub.com

Upstream source description

NetX Secure TLS accepts an empty application-data record without verifying its message authentication code. In `_nx_secure_verify_mac`, a decrypted application record whose length equals the negotiated MAC size is treated as valid and returns success after advancing the receive sequence number. The received MAC is never generated or compared. Empty TLS application-data records are legal, and are commonly emitted by TLS 1.0 implementations as a BEAST mitigation.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.