Answer in brief
CVE-2026-103365 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System <= 28.4 - Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Exposure in 'phone' Parameter to bookly_render_details. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Booklygeneric | >=0 <=28.4 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 10, 2026
The Bookly – Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to, and including, 28.4 via the classic booking form's Details step. The endpoint bookly_render_details is registered for both wp_ajax and wp_ajax_nopriv, the module overrides csrfTokenValid() to always return true, and Bookly\Frontend\Components\Booking\InfoText::getCodes() calls UserBookingData::getCustomer() to load the persisted Customer entity keyed solely by the attacker-supplied phone (or email) with no invocation of the plugin's own customerIdentityConfirmed() predicate. When a site owner has placed the supported {client_name}, {client_email}, {client_phone}, or {client_note} placeholders into the Details step's Appearance information text, the matched customer's stored name, email, phone and internal notes are substituted into the returned HTML. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who know only a registered customer's primary phone (or email) to read that customer's stored personal data.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.