Answer in brief
CVE-2026-104189 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in 3Dviewer-Nextcloud: Share password not enforced when streaming 3D models from a public link share. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloudgeneric | >=1.7.9 <3.3.2 | 3.3.2 |
Published upstream
Oct 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 27, 2026
The 3D Viewer for Nextcloud is a comprehensive 3D model viewer application for Nextcloud that supports multiple 3D file formats. In versions 1.7.9 through 3.3.1, the app's public file endpoint performed no share authorization. Anyone who knows a share token could read the shared file's contents even when the link share was protected by a password. `PublicFileController` extended `OCP\AppFramework\Controller` and marked its routes `#[PublicPage]`. Nextcloud only enforces share passwords through `PublicShareMiddleware`, which returns early for any controller that is not an `OCP\AppFramework\PublicShareController` instance — so no password, expiry, or share-type check ran for these routes. `ShareFileService::loadLinkShare()` compounded this by treating any token that `getShareByToken()` matched as authorised. A share token is the part of the URL that people paste into chats, emails, and tickets. Password protection exists precisely for the case where holding the token should not by itself grant access, and that guarantee did not hold. Requests to `GET /ocs/v2.php/apps/threedviewer/public/file/{token}/{fileId}` returned `200` with the full file body for password-protected shares, with no password and no session. Nextcloud's own share page correctly redirected such requests to the password prompt. Scope is limited to files in the formats this app handles (STL, GLB/glTF, OBJ, STEP, IFC, and the other supported 3D types). Non-3D files in the same share are unaffected. Expired shares returned `500` rather than leaking contents. This issue is fixed in 3.3.2. `PublicFileController` now extends `PublicShareController` and implements `isValidToken()`, `isPasswordProtected()`, and `getPasswordHash()`, delegating password and token validation to the framework and gaining brute-force throttling. `ShareFileService::findValidLinkShare()` additionally rejects share types other than link and email, rejects expired shares, and treats a `ShareNotFound` from the share manager as "no share" instead of letting it surface as a 500. As a workaround, disable the 3D Viewer app (`occ app:disable threedviewer`), or avoid relying on passwords to protect link shares that contain 3D model files, until you can upgrade.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.