Answer in brief
CVE-2026-104725 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in Groundhogg <= 4.9 - Authenticated (Custom+) Privilege Escalation to 'user' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automationgeneric | >=0 <=4.9 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 10, 2026
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 This is due to a missing ownership and capability check on the `user` parameter within the `process_edit()` function, which allows any authenticated user with the `edit_contacts` capability to reassign a contact record's linked WordPress user ID to any arbitrary account without requiring the `edit_users` or `promote_users` capabilities. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with sales_rep-level access and above, to escalate their privileges to administrator by linking a contact to an administrator's WordPress user ID, then creating a note containing the `{auto_login_link}` replacement tag to trigger generation of a valid auto-login permissions-key URL for the administrator-linked contact, and finally visiting that URL to authenticate as the targeted administrator. The auto-login URL is stored in the note content and is readable back by the attacker via the `view_notes` and `add_notes` capabilities that the sales_rep role holds by default.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.