Answer in brief
CVE-2026-104768 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in AutomatorWP <= 6.0.4 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Insufficient Role Validation in Anonymous Automation 'Role' Option. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps rubengc/AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps rubengc/AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| rubengc/AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AIgeneric | >=0 <=6.0.4 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 7, 2026
The AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 6.0.4. This is due to missing privilege-ceiling validation in the `create_user()` function within the anonymous-user action (and equally in the Create User and Add/Change Role WordPress-integration actions), which verify only that the submitted role exists via `automatorwp_get_editable_roles()` without confirming the role falls at or below the acting context's privilege level — allowing attacker-controlled trigger tag data (e.g., a `{comment_author}` tag bound to the Role option) to supply any role, including `administrator`, unchallenged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create a new administrator-role account tied to an attacker-controlled email address, receiving the generated password via WordPress's new-user notification email and thereby gaining full administrative access to the site. Exploitation requires the site to have an anonymous automation configured with the Role option bound to a dynamic trigger tag such as `{comment_author}`, and is triggered when a site administrator performs the routine action of approving a comment — an action that provides no in-UI indication that it will mint a new privileged account from the comment author field.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.