Answer in brief
CVE-2026-104993 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.4) vulnerability in GeoDirectory <= 2.8.188 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Contact Email Custom Field. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps paoltaia/GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps paoltaia/GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| paoltaia/GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directorygeneric | >=0 <=2.8.188 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 10, 2026
The GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'email (Contact Email custom field htmlvar_name)' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.188 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Successful exploitation requires that an administrator has added and configured the Contact Email custom field to render on the public single-listing output page, and that the administrator subsequently approves the attacker's submitted listing.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.