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  4. CVE 2026 105689 penpot ssrf guard bypass via ipv6 transition
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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 6.0CVE-2026-105689

Penpot: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo) in webhook delivery and media downloadCVE-2026-105689

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-105689 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.0) vulnerability in Penpot: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo) in webhook delivery and media download. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps penpot/penpot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 5, 2026Updated Oct 5, 2026Source checked Oct 5, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 5, 2026Material review Oct 5, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 6.0
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps penpot/penpot (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
penpot/penpotgeneric<2.18.02.18.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for penpot/penpot.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update penpot/penpot to 2.18.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 5, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record

  2. Source modified

    Oct 5, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record

  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 5, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

Penpot is an open-source design and prototyping platform. Prior to 2.18.0, app.util.ssrf/blocked-address? relies on Java InetAddress predicates that do not classify NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo addresses and applies additional CIDR checks only to IPv4 values. Exploitation requires routing through a NAT64 gateway or an attacker-controlled DNS AAAA record; cloud environments with NAT64 gateways are directly exploitable. A user controlling a media import URL, or an administrator controlling a webhook URL, can then supply an IPv6 transition address that embeds a cloud-metadata, loopback, link-local, or private IPv4 target and bypasses the intended SSRF restrictions. Media import can disclose response bodies, while webhook delivery can expose response status as a network-probing side channel. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • Penpot: Share-link page-scope escape — comment RPCs leak comment content, author identity, and all page-ids for pages outside the share scopeSame penpot/penpot package
  • Penpot: Repeated chunk index causes temporary-storage amplificationSame penpot/penpot package
  • Penpot: A team admin (non-owner) can remove the team owner via ::delete-team-member — missing owner-protectionSame penpot/penpot package
  • Penpot: Team admin can escalate to owner via team invitation (missing owner-role guard on the invitation path)Same penpot/penpot package
  • Penpot: Server-side session not invalidated on logout; stale auth-token cookie remains valid for full profile accessSame penpot/penpot package
  • Penpot: Authenticated OS Command Injection in Penpot SVG Exporter via Legacy fill-colorSame penpot/penpot package

Record context

Vulnerability class
SSRF
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-918
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 5, 2026
References
3 linked sources
Open source record