Hugo 0.91.0 through 0.165.0 Server-Side Request Forgery via security.http.urls Lacking Destination Address Validation (CVE-2026-10582) | HOL Guard CVE

Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-10582

Hugo 0.91.0 through 0.165.0 Server-Side Request Forgery via security.http.urls Lacking Destination Address Validation

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-10582 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Hugo 0.91.0 through 0.165.0 Server-Side Request Forgery via security.http.urls Lacking Destination Address Validation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 24, 2026Updated Aug 24, 2026Source checked Aug 24, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 24, 2026Material review Aug 24, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps gohugoio/hugo (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
gohugoio/hugogeneric	0.91.0	Not reported

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for gohugoio/hugo.
Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Aug 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Aug 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Aug 24, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.