Answer in brief
CVE-2026-107785 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in Crux Agent silently fails SKA preshared key rotation when SHA-512 peering is negotiated. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Sirius Computer, Inc./Crux Agent (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Sirius Computer, Inc./Crux Agent (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Sirius Computer, Inc./Crux Agentgeneric | >=1.9.0 <2.0.3 | 2.0.3 |
Published upstream
Oct 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 9, 2026
Crux Agent from 1.9.0 before 2.0.3 uses the full SKA bilocation key as the WireGuard preshared key. When a peering session negotiates use of SHA-512, the key produced is 64 bytes instead of the 32 bytes WireGuard requires. The agent does not validate this size; instead it attempts to use the `wg set` command to update the live tunnel, and write the invalid key to the WireGuard configuration file. The update fails, so the live tunnel keeps using its previous preshared key until the tunnel is shut down. The tunnel will fail to start when restarted. For a peer which has never successfully negotiated a 32-byte bilocation key in a Crux C2 organization which has the "Enforce SKA Use" setting turned off, no preshared key will be set for the tunnel. Therefore, an attacker who is able to intercept and store the peer's traffic, and has access (or will have access) to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, will be able to decrypt the tunnel.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.