High · CVSS 8.6CVE-2026-110022

Signed plug-in validation bypassCVE-2026-110022

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-110022 records a High severity (CVSS 8.6) vulnerability in Signed plug-in validation bypass. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Phoenix Contact/PLCnext Engineer (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Nov 4, 2026Updated Nov 4, 2026Source checked Nov 4, 2026First seen by HOL Nov 4, 2026Material review Nov 4, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: High · CVSS 8.6
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 1 mapped package or product
Fix availability: Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 8.6. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Phoenix Contact/PLCnext Engineer (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
Phoenix Contact/PLCnext Engineergeneric	>=0.0 <2026.6	2026.6

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Phoenix Contact/PLCnext Engineer.
Review the reported fix. Update Phoenix Contact/PLCnext Engineer to 2026.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Nov 4, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Source referencecertvde.com

Upstream source description

The PFI plugin framework deploys executable assemblies (DLLs) from a signed plugin package into the local plugin repository and loads them via reflection, but the deployment routine processes archive entries that were never covered by the signature verification. An unauthenticated local attacker can replace an unsigned DLL outside the signed prefix in the archive passes verification and overwrites the legitimate signed assembly at the same destination path. The plugin loader then instantiates the attacker-supplied code without any additional integrity check resulting in a full compromise of the affected systems.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.