Answer in brief
CVE-2026-110732 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework & MCP for WordPress <= 3.8.6 - Missing Authorization to Administrator Account Takeover via Unauthenticated MCP OAuth Client Registration. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps tigroumeow/AI Engine – MCP Server & AI Chatbot for WordPress, with Claude, ChatGPT & Gemini (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps tigroumeow/AI Engine – MCP Server & AI Chatbot for WordPress, with Claude, ChatGPT & Gemini (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| tigroumeow/AI Engine – MCP Server & AI Chatbot for WordPress, with Claude, ChatGPT & Geminigeneric | >=0 <=3.8.6 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 30, 2026
The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework & MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 3.8.6 This is due to the MCP module's OAuth 2.1 Dynamic Client Registration endpoint (/wp-json/mcp/v1/oauth/register) being registered with a permission_callback of __return_true, allowing an unauthenticated user to register an active OAuth client with an attacker-controlled redirect URI. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain an administrator-bound MCP access token, and thereby full administrator-level control through the MCP tools (including user creation and option updates), once an administrator approves the attacker's client on the OAuth consent screen. The consent page is additionally served without X-Frame-Options or Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors, so that approval can be obtained via clickjacking.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.