Answer in brief
CVE-2026-111114 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Nexter Extension <= 4.7.11 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation to 'reset-view' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps posimyththemes/Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps posimyththemes/Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| posimyththemes/Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkitgeneric | >=0 <=4.7.11 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 16, 2026
The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the `/?reset-view` handler in `role_switcher_to_view_admin_as()` performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the `profile_update` hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via `wp-admin/users.php?action=promote`, which calls `WP_User::set_role()` directly and leaves a stale `administrator` value in the `nxtext_view_admin_original_role` user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the `profile_update` hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.