Answer in brief
CVE-2026-111761 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.8) vulnerability in A2A Java SDK has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in push-notification delivery. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps a2aproject/a2a-java (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps a2aproject/a2a-java (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| a2aproject/a2a-javageneric | <1.3.0.Final | 1.3.0.Final |
Published upstream
Oct 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 20, 2026
A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Prior to 1.3.0.Final, BasePushNotificationSender in server-common sends task data to the URL in TaskPushNotificationConfig without destination validation, scheme restrictions, or bounds on redirects. InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore.setInfo stores the URL verbatim, and onCreateTaskPushNotificationConfig does not validate the destination. In the default deployment with push notifications enabled, an unauthenticated caller can register a destination through an inline SendMessage configuration or CreateTaskPushNotificationConfig for an existing task, causing task status and artifact updates to send requests from the server's network position to loopback, private, link-local cloud-metadata, IPv6 unique-local, unspecified, or multicast destinations where routing permits. JdkA2AHttpClient and VertxA2AHttpClient follow redirects, allowing a webhook redirect to bypass creation-time destination checks and convert a POST into a GET; hostname-only checks also do not prevent DNS rebinding. Direct POST delivery can push attacker-influenced task data into internal services, whereas a redirected POST-to-GET request drops the body. The sender discards the fetched response and does not expose delivery success or failure, so the demonstrated behavior does not provide response read-back. No credentials or user interaction are required. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.