Answer in brief
CVE-2026-114630 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System <= 3.3.8 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via 'ticket_attachment_path' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps elextensions/ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps elextensions/ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| elextensions/ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing Systemgeneric | >=0 <=3.3.8 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 6, 2026
The ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the factory_reset function in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.8 This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). This vulnerability is exploitable via a two-step chain: an unauthenticated attacker first stores an arbitrary ticket_attachment_path value by submitting a ticket through the nopriv eh_crm_new_ticket_post AJAX endpoint (whose nonce is publicly exposed via the [wsdesk_support] shortcode), then triggers the factory_reset routine via a GET request to wp-admin/admin.php?page=wsdesk_factory_reset, which is guarded only by is_admin() — a request-type check — rather than a capability check, causing unlink() to be called on the attacker-supplied path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.