Answer in brief
CVE-2026-115770 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.6) vulnerability in Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pocket-id/pocket-id (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.6. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pocket-id/pocket-id (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pocket-id/pocket-idgeneric | >=2.2.0 <2.12.0 | 2.12.0 |
Published upstream
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 4, 2026
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.