Answer in brief
CVE-2026-119446 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.4) vulnerability in Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves-hub (generic), nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web (generic), nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves-hub (generic), nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web (generic), nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves-hubgeneric | >=2.5.0 <2.5.3 | 2.5.3 |
| nerves-hub/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_webgeneric | >=e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564 <3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 | 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 |
| nerves-hub/nerves_hub_webgeneric | >=2.5.0 <2.5.3 | 2.5.3 |
Published upstream
Nov 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 10, 2026
Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.