Answer in brief
CVE-2026-120560 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE <= 2.1.5 - Unauthenticated File Deletion via 'wp_columns_actions' and 'table_id' Parameters. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps realmag777/Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps realmag777/Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| realmag777/Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREEgeneric | >=0 <=2.1.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 7, 2026
The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.