## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
Update form-data to 2.5.6; form-data to 3.0.5; form-data to 4.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanform-data: CRLF injection in form-data via unescaped multipart field names and filenames affects form-data (npm), form-data (npm), form-data (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| form-datanpm | <2.5.6 | 2.5.6 |
| form-datanpm | >=3.0.0,<3.0.5 | 3.0.5 |
| form-datanpm | >=4.0.0,<4.0.6 | 4.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate form-data to 2.5.6; form-data to 3.0.5; form-data to 4.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanform-data: CRLF injection in form-data via unescaped multipart field names and filenames affects form-data (npm), form-data (npm), form-data (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary `form-data` builds `multipart/form-data` request bodies. Through v4.0.5, the `field` name passed to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated directly into the `Content-Disposition` header with no escaping of CR (`\r`), LF (`\n`), or `"`. An application that uses **untrusted input as a field name or filename** therefore lets an attacker terminate the header line and either inject additional headers or smuggle whole additional multipart parts into the request the application forwards to a backend. This is CWE-93 (CRLF injection). It is a divergence from how browsers and the WHATWG HTML spec serialize form-data (they escape these characters), so the fix is to match that behavior. Severity is **conditional**: it depends on the consuming application passing attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename. Applications that only use fixed/trusted field names are not affected. ## Details In `lib/form_data.js`, `_multiPartHeader` builds the part header as: ```javascript 'Content-Disposition': ['form-data', 'name="' + field + '"'].concat(contentDisposition || []) ``` and `_getContentDisposition` builds `filename="' + filename + '"'`. Neither escapes control characters, so a `\r\n` in `field`/`filename` ends the header line. The same applies to `"`, which can break out of the quoted parameter. ### Proof of concept ```javascript const FormData = require('form-data'); const form = new FormData(); form.append('email"\r\nX-Injected: true\r\nfake="', '[email protected]'); console.log(form.getBuffer().toString()); ``` Before the fix this emits an injected `X-Injected: true` header line. A field name that also includes `--<boundary>` sequences can introduce additional parts (e.g. an extra `name="is_admin"` field), which a downstream parser accepts as legitimate. ## Impact For an application that uses untrusted field names/filenames: - **Field injection / override (integrity).** Inject or override fields the backend trusts (e.g. `is_admin`, `role`) — the primary demonstrated impact. - **Header injection** into the generated multipart part. Claims of guaranteed privilege escalation, authentication bypass, high confidentiality impact, and availability impact are application-dependent downstream consequences, not properties of `form-data` itself, and are not demonstrated by the PoC. ### Severity The demonstrated, library-attributable impact is integrity (field/header injection); there is no demonstrated confidentiality disclosure or availability impact in `form-data` itself, and exploitation requires the consuming app to feed untrusted data into field names/filenames. A Moderate (≈5.3, `I:L`) rating is also defensible given that precondition. ## Patch Fixed in **4.0.6**, **3.0.5**, and **2.5.6**. Users on older 0.x/1.x/2.x releases should upgrade to 2.5.6 or later. The fix escapes `\r`, `\n`, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the WHATWG HTML `multipart/form-data` encoding algorithm that browsers implement. This neutralizes the injection while leaving ordinary field names (including `name[0]`, dotted, and unicode names) unchanged. ## Workaround Until upgrading, validate or reject field names/filenames that contain control characters before calling `append`: ```javascript if (/[\r\n]/.test(field)) { throw new Error('invalid field name'); } ``` ## Credit Reported by [yueyueL](https://github.com/yueyueL).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| form-datanpm | <2.5.6 | 2.5.6 |
| form-datanpm | >=3.0.0,<3.0.5 | 3.0.5 |
| form-datanpm | >=4.0.0,<4.0.6 | 4.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard