Answer in brief
CVE-2026-125294 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Unicode Collation Confusion in 'tpgb_acf_key' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps POSIMYTH/Nexter Blocks Pro (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps POSIMYTH/Nexter Blocks Pro (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| POSIMYTH/Nexter Blocks Progeneric | >=0 <=5.0.10 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 21, 2026
The Nexter Blocks Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.10 via the `tpgb_ajax_register_user()` function. This is due to a byte-level denylist on the `tpgb_acf_key[]` and `tpgb_acf[]` parameters that fails to block Unicode look-alike characters — such as U+1E87 and U+00E7 in a key like `ẇp_çapabilities` — whose UTF-8 byte sequences do not match any ASCII-based pattern check, while the database's default accent-insensitive collation (`utf8mb4_unicode_ci` / `utf8mb4_0900_ai_ci`) treats the decorated key as equivalent to the canonical `wp_capabilities` row, causing `update_user_meta()` to overwrite the newly registered user's role with `administrator`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to register a new account bearing the full Administrator role, gaining complete control over the WordPress site including the ability to install plugins, modify files, and execute arbitrary code. The nonce required by the handler is publicly emitted on any page containing the tp-login-register block, making the full exploit chain — nonce retrieval, a single crafted registration POST, and the plugin's own `autologin` flow — trivially reachable on any default install where user registration is enabled. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete Administrator role.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.